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ABSTRACT 
Mobile IPv6 is an IP-layer mobility protocol that is 
designed to provide mobility support, allowing an IPv6 node 
to arbitrarily change its location on the IPv6 Internet and 
still maintain existing connections by handling the change 
of addresses at the Internet layer using Mobile IPv6 
messages, options, and processes that ensure the correct 
delivery of data regardless of the mobile node's location. 
Return Routability is an infrastructureless, lightweight 
procedure that enables a mobile IPv6 node to request 
another IPv6 node (maybe unaware of mobility) to test the 
ownership of its permanent IPv6 address in both its home 
network and its temporary address in the current IPv6 
network; and authorizes a binding procedure by the use of a 
cryptographic token exchange. 
The main objective of this research effort is to build 
a test bed for investigating the vulnerabilities of the 
Mobile IPv6 RR procedure. The test bed shall facilitate the 
enactment and analysis of the effects of specific threats 
on the hosts and the network. While this thesis is not 
about discovering new vulnerabilities or evaluating 
countermeasures, the resulting test bed and software shall 
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Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) is a network layer protocol for 
enabling mobility in IPv6 networks. IP mobility technology 
has gained a significant amount of traction over the last 
few years, mainly due to the following factors [Soliman04]: 
• Increasing dependence of society on information 
and the need to access it from any place and any 
time 
• Wide spread deployment of high-speed wireless 
networks. 
• Emergence of 3G wireless networks that support 
packet data services. 
• Affordable mobile devices that are 
multifunctional and capable of services that go 
beyond just voice and SMS 
• Inclusion of IP stacks in PDAs, mobile phones and 
portable PCs. 
Mobile IPv6 is the network layer protocol developed to 
replace mobile IPv4. IPv6 has a larger address space and is 
expected to improve network performance and network 
security over that of IPv4. The intended improvements 
include both enhancements of existing IPv4 functionalities 
and new features. Most of the former category of 
improvements have been tested and analyzed during the 
operational period of IPv4; the new features; however, have 
not been equally tested. Some of them still have not been 
incorporated into popular operating systems, and some exist 
only as RFC specifications, with no actual implementation. 
One of the new features of Mobile IPv6 is the Return 
Routability (RR) procedure, an infrastructureless solution 
to achieve Routing Optimization and avoid routing 
triangles.  
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This procedure is the subject of serious discussions 
concerning its security implications. Several problems have 
been identified, and solutions have been proposed 
[Johnson04]. A systematic implementation and analysis in a 
laboratory environment of the potential threats to the 
hosts and the network, during the execution of the RR 
process, will help in the evaluation of the proposed 
solutions and in research for new ones. Such analysis, 
together with the tools to gather the data to support that 
analysis, is the focus of this thesis. 
A. OBJECTIVE 
The main objective of this research effort is to build 
a test bed for investigating the vulnerabilities of the 
Mobile IPv6 RR procedure. The test bed shall facilitate the 
enactment and analysis of the effects of specific threats 
on the hosts and the network. The threats shall be 
implemented in software and validated using the test bed. 
While this thesis is not about discovering new 
vulnerabilities or evaluating countermeasures, the 
resulting test bed and software shall lay the necessary 
groundwork for future research in those directions. Thus, 
the following tasks will be accomplished. 
1.  Identify known security issues with the proposed 
Mobile IPv6 RR procedure. 
2.  Configure a suite of hardware components to 
investigate the susceptibility of the 
autoconfiguration protocol to the selected risks. 
3.  Implement attacks against the test bed and assess 
the performance of the protocol in the presence 
of malicious activity. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis investigates the following specific 
issues. 
1. Are there any OSs that support the proposed 
security functions of MIPv6, and if there are, to 
which extent? 
2. How do the components of the MIPv6 secure their 
communication? 
3. What are the possible threats to secure 
communication between the mobile IPv6 nodes? 
4. What are the suggested solutions? 
5. Are there any known exploits of the 
vulnerabilities of the MIPv6? 
6. Are there any proposed threat mitigation 
solutions, and if so, what are they? 
C. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized as follows. 
Chapter I provides and introduction to the thesis and 
the rudiments of the Mobile IPv6 protocol. 
Chapter II presents the need for transition to IPv6, 
the benefits of IP Mobility, and provides an overview of 
the Mobile IPv6 protocol. In addition, it describes the RR 
procedure and the assumptions made for the design 
implementation of the MIPv6 protocol. It is intended to be 
a high-level description that will introduce the MIPv6 
terminology and help the reader comprehend how the MIPv6 
protocol and its RR procedure work. 
Chapter III presents the layout and configuration 
process of the implemented MIPv6 test bed. A very limited 
number of published host operating systems are advertised 
to have support for MIPv6. Worse, all the available MIPv6 
capable OS releases are experimental in nature and still 
going through rigorous validation tests. As such, a 
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significant amount of effort for this thesis was spent 
determining a working combination of OS version and MIPv6 
extension in a “trial and error” manner. The experience is 
documented in this chapter. This chapter is intended to 
provide sufficient details so that it can be used as a 
“how-to” guide for deploying a MIPv6 test bed using open-
source software. 
An evaluation of the RR procedure is provided in 
Chapter IV that is based on the experimental results from 
both Chapter III and the research of [Aura06], which was 
published during this research. 
Conclusions and recommendations for threat mitigation 
are presented in the final chapter, along with suggestions 




This chapter briefly presents the argument for 
transition to IPv6, the rudiments of the IP Mobility 
protocol, and the Mobile IPv6 protocol in particular. 
Finally, it describes the RR procedure and the assumptions 
made for the design implementation of the MIPv6 protocol. 
It is intended to be a high-level description that will 
introduce the Mobile IPv6 terminology (MIPv6) and help the 
reader comprehend how the MIPv6 protocol and its attendant 
RR procedure work. 
A. THE NEED FOR TRANSITION TO IPV6 
The Internet Protocol (IP) is a data-oriented protocol 
used for communicating data across a packet-switched 
internetwork. IP is a network layer protocol in the 
internet protocol suite and is encapsulated in a data link 
layer protocol (e.g., Ethernet). As a lower layer protocol, 
IP provides the service of communicable unique global 
addressing amongst computers. This implies that the data 
link layer need not provide this service. Ethernet provides 
globally unique addresses except it is not globally 
communicable (i.e., two arbitrarily chosen Ethernet devices 
will only be able to communicate if they are on the same 
bus). The difference is that IP is concerned with the final 
destination of data packets. Ethernet is concerned with 
only the next device (computer, router, etc.) in the chain. 
The final destination and next device could be one and the 
same (if they are on the same bus), but the final 
destination could be on the other side of the world 
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Protocol Last 
visited on February 2, 2007]. 
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The current version of the IP protocol (IPv4) has not 
changed a lot since RFC 791, which was published in 1981. 
It is common belief that IPv4 served us well for over 25 
years and still does. 
However, the initial design of IPv4 did not anticipate 
contemporary issues such as [Soliman04]: 
• The exponential growth of the Internet and the 
impending exhaustion of the IPv4 address space. 
• The need for simpler and more automatic 
configuration of addresses and other settings 
that do not necessarily rely on the 
administration of a DHCP infrastructure. 
• The requirement for security at the IP level. 
• The need for better support for real-time 
delivery of data. 
• The emergence of IP-capable mobile devices.  
• The need of society to access information from 
any place and at any time. 
To address not only these, but also many proposed 
methods for improving IPv4, the IETF has developed a suite 
of protocols and standards known as IP version 6 (IPv6) 
with the following features [Davies02]: 
• New header format 
• Larger address space 
• Efficient and hierarchical addressing and routing 
infrastructure 
• Stateless and stateful address auto configuration 
• Built-in security 
• Better support for quality of service (QoS) 
• A new protocol for neighboring node interaction 
• Extensibility 
In addition, the internals of the IPv6 protocol have 
been designed with scalability and extensibility in mind. 
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This will allow many different kinds of devices besides 
PCs, like cell phones and home appliances, to more easily 
join the Internet in future 
[http://wireless.about.com/od/networkprotocolsip/g/bldef_ip
v6.htm Last visited on February 5, 2007]. 
B. IP MOBILITY 
IP Mobility is defined as the change in a node’s IP 
address due to the following reasons: 
• Change of its attachment point within the 
Internet topology. 
• Change in the topology itself, which causes a 
node to change its address. 
Mobility is considered to be an important issue, and 
the need for an IP mobility management solution is 
motivated by the following [Soliman04]: 
• Users would like to have the choice of using 
certain technologies over others. 
• Hosts need to be reachable independently of their 
“normal” (home) physical origin. 
Mobile IPv6 is designed to handle the mobility management 
on the IP layer for the emerging IPv6 protocol.  
The solution to IP mobility is the Mobile IP protocol, 
designed to allow mobile device users to move from one 
network to another while maintaining reachability via their 
permanent/home IP address. Defined in RFC 2002, Mobile IP 
is an enhancement of the Internet Protocol (IP) that adds 
mechanisms for forwarding Internet traffic to mobile 
devices (known as mobile nodes) when they are connecting 
through other than their home network. 
[http://searchmobilecomputing.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,
,sid40_gci849848,00.html Last visited on February 5, 2007] 
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C. MOBILE IPV6 TERMINOLOGY 
In order for the reader to better understand the 
description of the MIPv6 protocol and the RR procedure, its 
concomitant terminology and message transactions are 
presented in this section: 
Home link: The home link is the link that is assigned 
the home subnet prefix. The mobile node uses the home 
subnet prefix to create a home address. 
Home Address (HA): A unicast routable address assigned 
to a mobile node, used as the permanent address of the 
mobile node. This address is within the mobile node's home 
link. Standard IP routing mechanisms will deliver packets 
destined for a mobile node's home address to its home link. 
Mobile nodes can have multiple home addresses, for instance 
when there are multiple home prefixes on the home link. 
Home Agent (HA): The home agent is a router on the 
home link that maintains an awareness of the mobile nodes 
of its home link that are away from home and the addresses 
that they are currently using. If a mobile node is on the 
home link, the home agent acts as a normal IPv6 router, 
forwarding packets addressed to the mobile node. If the 
mobile node is away from home, the home agent tunnels data 
sent to the mobile node's home address to the mobile node's 
current (remote) location on the IPv6 Internet. 
Mobile node (MN): A mobile node is an IPv6 node that 
can change links/networks, and therefore addresses, and yet 
continue to maintain reachability using its home address. A 




global address of its current link address, and indicates 
its home address to the home agent and IPv6 nodes with 
which it is communicating. 
Foreign link: A foreign link is a link that is not the 
mobile node's home link. A foreign link is assigned a 
foreign subnet prefix.  
Care-of Address (CoA): the temporary, network-specific 
IP address for routing messages to the mobile node’s 
current location. The association of a care-of address with 
a home address for a mobile node is known as a binding. 
Correspondent nodes and home agents keep information on 
bindings in a binding cache. 
Correspondent Node (CN): A correspondent node is an 
IPv6 node that is capable of communicating with a mobile 
node while it is away from home. A CN can also be a mobile 
node. 
Cookie: random number used by a mobile node used to 
prevent spoofing by a bogus CN in the RR procedure. 
Care-of init cookie: a cookie sent to the CN in the 
Care-of Test Init message, to be returned in the Care-of 
Test message. 
Home init cookie: a cookie sent to the CN in the Home 
Test Init message, to be returned in the Home Test message. 
Keygen Token: a number supplied by a CN in the RR 
procedure to enable the MN to compute the necessary binding 
management key for authorizing a BU. 
Nonces: random numbers used internally by the CN in 
the creation of keygen tokens related to the RR procedure. 
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Binding management key (Kbm): Key used for authorizing 
a binding cache management message (e.g., BU and BACK 
messages). 
Binding Update (BU): Used by a mobile node to notify 
other nodes of a new care-of address. It can also be used 
to delete old bindings. 
Binding Acknowledgement (BA): Used to acknowledge 
receipt of a Binding Update. 
Binding Refresh Request (BRR): Used by the CN to 
inform the mobile node that the binding is (or is going) 
stale. 
Binding Error (BE): It is used by the CN to signal an 
error. 
D. MOBILE IPV6 
Mobile IPv6 grew out of experiences with Mobile IPv4; 
itself an attempt to enable IP attached devices to migrate 
between physical networks without having to change the 
publicly visible IP address by which they were uniquely 
known to the rest of the Internet. 
When a node moves from one access network to another 
or switches between access technologies, it acquires a new 
IPv6 address and cannot be reached directly via its old 
IPv6 address due to its router’s ingress filtering. This 
implies that all current communications (for example 
streaming video from the Internet or a TCP session) are 




The Mobile IPv6 protocol (RFC 3775) has been defined 
to address those issues and allow the node to be always 
reachable at the same IPv6 address whatever the access 
network it uses. It allows the host to move transparently 
for the applications and the users, without the need to 
reset all the current connections each time the host moves 
to another access network.  
Its design aims to solve two problems: 
• To allow transport layer sessions (TCP 
connections and UDP-based transactions) to 
continue even if the host(s) move and change 
their IP addresses.  
• To allow a node to be reached through a static IP 
address; that is, a home (of) address (HoA).  
E. BASIC MOBILE IPV6 PROCESS-TUNNELING MODE 
The basic idea in Mobile IPv6 is to allow a home agent 
(HA) to work as a stationary proxy for a mobile node (MN). 
Whenever the mobile node is away from its home network, the 
home agent intercepts packets destined to the node and 
forwards the packets by tunneling them to the node's 
current address, the care-of address (CoA). The transport 
layer (e.g., TCP, UDP) uses the home address as a 
stationary identifier for the mobile node. 
With Mobile IPv6, a host has two addresses while 
moving in the Internet topology: one permanent address that 
identifies the host, and the other representing the 
location in the Internet topology. The Mobile IPv6 protocol 
takes care of the binding between these two addresses 
(thanks to a Home Agent), and ensures that the host is 
always reachable at its permanent address even if it moves 
in the Internet topology. 
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Mobile IPv6 adopts a new strategy for securing a MN 
that roams around the Internet. A MN needs to keep getting 
new local IP addresses (CoA) and keep his HA informed that 
he's moved and where he has gone. 
There are two possible modes for communications 
between the mobile node and a CN in MIPv6. The first mode, 
bidirectional tunneling, does not require Mobile IPv6 
support from the CN and is available even if the mobile 
node has not registered its current binding with the CN. 
Packets from the CN are routed to the home agent and then 
tunneled to the mobile node. Packets to the CN are tunneled 
from the mobile node to the home agent ("reverse tunneled") 
and then routed normally from the home network to the CN. 
The roaming device is authenticated through its home 
address, and all communications to that device pass through 
the home address before being sent to the temporary 
location (CoA). 
Bidirectional tunneling is responsible for triangle 
routing. Triangle routing may incur unnecessary latency, 
which is not desirable for real time traffic such as VoIP. 
Also it impacts on reliability since a longer data path is 
more likely to break due to a link failure.  
In a nutshell, the bidirectional tunneling is 
described by the following steps: 
1. The MN uses its HoA when it is in its home 
network. A datagram sent from CN to MN, will be 
sent to MN’s HA. 
2. HA delivers the datagram to MN at its HoA. 
3. MN moves to a visiting network and acquires a 
temporary IP address, CoA from the agent (local 
router) of the visiting network. 
4. The MN registers its CoA to its HA. 
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5. The CN sends a datagram to the MN, unaware if it 
is in its home network, to the only address that 
it can reach the MN, its HoA. 
6. The HA forwards the datagram to MN, at its CoA. 
7. The MN sends datagrams to CN, tunneling them 
through its HA due to ingress filtering. 
The above procedure is illustrated in Figure 1 below. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Bidirectional Tunneling of Mobile IPv6 
 
This is the basic mode of function of Mobile IPv6 in 
absence of any optimization and is called triangle routing 
because every message between MN and CN has to route via 
the MN’s Home Agent. 
Triangle routing may create delays, caused by a long 
trip time that affects real time traffic such as VoIP. 
Also, it impacts on reliability since the longer path may 


















Route optimization is an optional feature of Mobile 
IPv6 that eliminates triangle routing. It is a mode of 
operation that allows the mobile node and its peer, a CN, 
to exchange packets directly, bypassing the home agent 
completely after the initial setup phase. 
When route optimization is used, the mobile node sends 
its current care-of address to the CN, using binding update 
(BU) messages. The CN stores the binding between the home 
address and care-of address into its Binding Cache. One way 
to achieve route optimization is the implementation of the 
RR procedure, an infrastructureless solution in which the 
MN requests the CN to test its ownership of the HoA and CoA 
and authorizes a binding procedure by the use of a 
cryptographic token exchange. 
F. OVERVIEW OF RETURN ROUTABILITY (RR) PROCEDURE  
Mobile IPv6 Route Optimization verifies a mobile 
node's authenticity through a routing property. H. Soliman 
in Chapter 5 of his book, [Soliman04], describes the Return 
Routability (RR) procedure with great detail. The essence 
of the RR procedure is that the MN requests that the CN 
test its ownership of its HoA and CoA. This is done by 
sending two independent messages: the Home address Test 
Init (HOTI) and Care-Of address Test Init (COTI). The CN 
creates two tokens that only the CN can create (encrypt 
with a secret key Kcn that is known only to CN) and sends 
one token to each address (home and care-of addresses) in 




The mobile node uses both of these tokens to create a 
key (Kbm) that can be used to authenticate a binding update 
message to the CN. Since the CN knows all the information 
needed to produce the key, it can reproduce it when the 
binding update is received, and so authenticate the 
message. The same key is used to authenticate the binding 
acknowledgment. 
The HOTI message is sent by the mobile node to request 
a test of the home address. The source address used in the 
IPv6 header is the mobile node’s home address and the 
destination is the CN’s address. Hence, this message has to 
be tunneled to the home agent (since the home address is 
not topologically correct in the visited network), which 
decapsulates the message and forwards it to the CN. The 
HOTI message is transported inside a mobility header type 
1. This message contains a cookie (called home init cookie) 
generated by the mobile node and later returned by the CN. 
The cookie is a random number that has no significance; it 
is included to ensure that the entity responding to the 
HOTI message has actually received it. This message is 
protected on the mobile node–home agent path by ESP in 
tunnel mode. 
The home agent verifies the ESP header and forwards 
the internal message to the CN. In this case the home agent 
is not provided with a home address option in the outer 
header (unlike the binding update message) to use in order 
to locate the right security association in the SAD. In 
this scenario, the home agent’s SPD is configured to treat 
the mobile node’s care-of address as a security gateway 
address. The implication of this configuration is that the 
home agent can associate a security association entry in 
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the SAD with a specific tunnel interface, identified by the 
mobile node’s care-of address. Hence, the home agent will 
be able to identify the security association based on the 
interface from which it was received. This message (and the 
HOT message) is treated differently by not including the 
home address option. The reason is that the binding update 
is sent before establishing the tunnel. Therefore, no 
tunnel interface can be used to identify the security 
association. 
Almost simultaneously, the mobile node can send a COTI 
message. The COTI message is sent from the mobile node’s 
care-of address directly to the CN. It is transported in a 
mobility header type 2. The message contains another random 
cookie (called care-of init cookie). The COTI cookie is a 
random number used to ensure that the responder to a COTI 
message has actually received the original (COTI) message.  
When the CN receives the HOTI message, it generates a 
64-bit home keygen token (the token generated is based on 
the home address). The home keygen token is generated by 
taking the first 64 bits of the output of a message 
authentication code function using Kcn and is then computed 
on the concatenation of the home address and a nonce 
generated by the CN as follows: 
Home keygen token = First (64, HMAC_SHA1(Kcn, home 
address|nonce|0)) 
where First(n, j) represents the first n bits in j. 
HMAC_SHA1(Kcn, info) means a hashed message authentication 
code (or a keyed hash) based on the SHA1 hash algorithm and  
uses Kcn to key the function, which operates on info. The 0 
is used to distinguish the home keygen token from the care-
of keygen token, shown later. 
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The CN then constructs a HOT message and sends it to 
the mobile node. This message contains the home init cookie 
originally sent by the mobile node and the home keygen 
token. Since the CN generates nonces frequently, it needs 
to be aware of the nonce used to generate a particular 
cookie. Nonces are stored in an indexed list. Therefore, a 
CN only needs to know the index corresponding to a 
particular nonce to be able to generate the home keygen 
token again. The nonce index is included in the HOT 
message. This will be needed later by the CN to 
authenticate the binding update. 
The message will be intercepted by the home agent and 
tunneled to the mobile node’s care-of address. A secure 
tunnel (ESP) is used to forward this message to the mobile 
node. 
A similar operation is done when the CN receives the 
COTI message. It generates a care-of keygen token, where 
Care-of keygen token = First(64, MAC (Kcn, care-of address 
|nonce|1)) 
The nonce used in this operation might not be the same 
nonce used to create a home keygen token, depending on when 
the COTI message was received (the CN might have generated 
a new nonce). Therefore, the nonce index should be sent to 
the mobile node in the COT message.  
This message concludes the RR procedure. At this 
point, the CN has not yet stored any more information than 
it had at the beginning of this procedure: Kcn and an 
indexed list of nonces. The CN stores neither the home 
keygen token nor the care-of keygen token. When needed, 
these tokens can be regenerated, given the nonce indices 
originally used to generate them. 
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After receiving the HOT (tunneled from the home agent) 
and the COT message, the mobile node is in a position to 
generate a binding management key, Kbm. This is done as 
follows: 
Kbm = SHA1 (home keygen token|care-of keygen token) 
The mobile node can now construct the mobility header 
used for the binding update message. The mobility header 
includes the binding update, a nonce indices option, and a 
binding authorization data option. The nonce indices option 
contains the two indices received in the HOT and COT 
messages. 
The authentication data are calculated as follows: 
Auth_data = First (96, MAC(Kbm, Mobility_data) 
where 
Mobility_data = care-of address| final dst| Mobility header 
data 
The mobility header data includes the content of the 
mobility header with the exception of the authorization 
data option itself. The final destination is the packet’s 
final destination, that is, the CN’s address. If the CN 
were also a mobile node, a routing header type 2 
(containing its home address) would be included in the 
packet. Since the routing header is processed before the 
mobility header, the final dst field should contain that 
CN’s home address. 
Since the CN does not keep state for any mobile nodes 
during the RR procedure, the mobile node needs to include 
its home and care-of addresses in the binding update. The 
home address is included in a home address option (in a 
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destination options extension header), which precedes the 
mobility header. If the care-of address were different from 
the packet’s source address, it should be included in the 
alternate-care-of address option; otherwise, the packet’s 
source address is assumed to be the care-of address. In any 
case, the care-of address should always be the one used in 
the source address field of the COTI message; otherwise, 
the wrong care-of keygen token will be used to generate Kbm 
when the binding update is received at the CN. 
After the binding update message is constructed, the 
mobile node sends it to the CN. 
When the CN receives the binding update, it looks into 
the nonce indices option and finds the corresponding 
nonces. The CN will be able to regenerate Kbm as follows: 
1.  Generate home keygen token: First (64, MAC (Kcn, 
home address| nonce|0)). The home address is 
taken from the home address option. 
2.  Generate care-of keygen token: First (64, MAC 
(Kcn, care-of address| nonce|1)). The care-of 
address is taken from the alternate care- of 
address option when present; otherwise, the 
source address is used. 
3.  Generate Kbm: Hash (home keygen token|care-of 
keygen token). 
4. Calculate Auth_data: First (96, MAC(Kbm, 
Mobility_data). 
5.  If Auth_data is equal to the content of the 
binding authorization data option, accept the 
binding update. 
If an acknowledgment is requested, the CN must send a 
binding acknowledgment. The binding acknowledgment should 
also contain the binding authorization data option.  
The binding refresh advice option informs the mobile 
node about the time when a new binding update is needed. 
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The advantage of the RR procedure is that it is 
lightweight and does not require pre-shared authentication 
material. It also requires no state at the CN. On the other 
hand, the two reachability tests can lead to a handoff 
delay unacceptable for many real time or interactive 
applications such as Voice over IP (VoIP) and video 
conferencing. Also, the security that the Return-
Routability procedure guarantees might not be sufficient 
for security-sensitive applications. And finally, 
periodically refreshing a registration at a CN implies a 
hidden signaling overhead that may prevent mobile nodes 
from hibernation during times of inactivity [Arkko06]. 
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Figure 2.   Timing Diagram and Message Format of RR Procedure 
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G. PRIOR EVALUATIONS OF MIPV6 PROTOCOL 
One important base assumption is that the routing 
prefixes available to a node are determined by its current 
location, and therefore the node must change its IP address 
as it moves. In current IPv6 operational practice the IP 
address prefixes are distributed in a hierarchical manner. 
This limits the number of routing table entries each 
individual router needs to handle. An important implication 
is that the topology determines what globally routable IP 
addresses are available at a given location. That is, the 
nodes cannot freely decide what globally routable IP 
address to use; they must rely on the routing prefixes 
served by the local routers via Router Advertisements or by 
a DHCP server. In other words, IP addresses are just what 
the name says, addresses (i.e., locators) [Nikander05]. 
Furthermore, in the current Internet structure, the 
routers collectively maintain a distributed database of the 
network topology and forward each packet towards the 
location determined by the destination address carried in 
the packet. To maintain the topology information, the 
routers must trust each other, at least to a certain 
extent. The routers learn the topology information from the 
other routers, and they have no option but to trust their 
neighbor routers about distant topology. At the borders of 
administrative domains, policy rules are used to limit the 
amount of—perhaps faulty—routing table information received 
from the peer domains. While this is mostly used to weed 
out administrative mistakes, it also helps with security. 
The aim is to maintain a reasonably accurate idea of the 
network topology even if someone is feeding faulty 
information to the routing system [Nikander05]. 
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In the Mobile IPv6 security design, different 
approaches were chosen for securing the communication 
between the mobile node and its home agent and between the 
mobile node and its CNs. In the home agent case, it was 
assumed that the mobile node and the home agent know each 
other through a prior arrangement, such as a business 
relationship. In contrast, it was strictly assumed that the 
mobile node and the CN do not need to have any prior 
arrangement, thereby allowing Mobile IPv6 to function in a 
scalable manner without requiring any configuration at the 
CNs [Nikander05]. 
The Return-Routability procedure was designed with the 
objective of providing a level of security that compares to 
that of today's non-mobile Internet. As such, it protects 
against impersonation, denial of service, and redirection-
based flooding attacks that would not be possible without 
Route Optimization. This approach is based on an assumption 
that a mobile Internet cannot become any safer than the 
non-mobile Internet [Nikander05]. 
The goal of the current Mobile IPv6 route optimization 
security has been to produce a design with a level of 
security close to that of a static IPv4-based Internet, and 
with an acceptable cost in terms of packets, delay, and 
processing. The result is not what one would expect. It is 
definitely not a traditional cryptographic protocol. 
Instead, the result relies heavily on the assumption of an 
uncorrupted routing infrastructure and builds upon the idea 
of checking that an alleged mobile node is indeed reachable 
through both its home address and its care-of address. 
Furthermore, the lifetime of the state created at the  
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corresponded nodes is deliberately restricted to a few 
minutes, in order to limit the potential threat from time 
shifting [Nikander05]. 
Moreover, given the typically limited bandwidth in a 
wireless medium, resources ought to be spent in an economic 
matter. This is especially important for the amount of 
signaling that a mobility protocol requires [Arkko06]. 
Additionally, applications that require a security 
level higher than what the Return-Routability procedure can 
provide are generally advised to use end-to-end protection 
such as IPsec or Transport Layer Security (TLS) [Arkko06]. 
RR protects certain signaling messages, exchanged 
between a mobile node and its home agent, through an 
authenticated and encrypted tunnel. This prevents 
unauthorized nodes on that path, including eavesdroppers in 
the mobile node's wireless access network, from listening 
in on these messages [Soliman04]. 
Given that a pre-existing end-to-end security 
relationship between the mobile node and the CN cannot 
generally be assumed, this protection exists only for the 
mobile node's side. If the CN is immobile, the path between 
the home agent and the CN remains unprotected. This is a 
path between two stationary nodes, so all types of attacks 
that a villain could wage on this path are already possible 
in the non-mobile Internet. In case the CN is mobile, it 
has its own home agent, and only the path between the two 
(stationary) home agents remains unprotected [Arkko06]. 
RFC 3775 fails to conceal a mobile node's current 
position as route-optimized packets always carry both home 
and care-of addresses. Both the CN and a third party can 
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therefore track the mobile node's whereabouts. A workaround 
is to fall back to bidirectional tunneling where location 
privacy is needed. Packets carrying the mobile node's care-
of address are thus only transferred between the mobile 
node and the home agent, where they can be encrypted 
through IPsec ESP. But even then, the mobile node should 
periodically re-establish its IPsec security associations 
so as to become untraceable through its SPIs [Arkko06]. 
The RR procedure implicitly assumes that the routing 
infrastructure is secure and trusted. Thus, it is 
appropriate to design a protocol to secure the binding 
update as long as it is no less secure than the underlying 
routing infrastructure. In other words, if a packet is sent 
to a particular destination, the routing system delivers it 
to that destination. If an attacker compromises the routing 
infrastructure and manages to control one or more routers, 
several serious attacks can be launched independently of RR 
procedures [Soliman04]. 
The RR procedure protects Binding Updates against all 
attackers who are unable to monitor the path between the 
home agent and the CN. The procedure does not defend 
against attackers who can monitor this path [Aura06]. 
Another assumption made by RR is that it is difficult 
for an attacker to be located on two different paths at the 
same time and receive both tokens needed to generate Kbm. 
This could happen if an attacker is sharing a link with the 
CN; he would be able to see all of the RR packets, 
construct a binding update message, send it to the CN, and 
receive all of the CN’s traffic addressed to the mobile 
node. However, an attacker does not need to go through all 
this trouble to hijack the CN’s connections with the mobile 
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node if he shares a link with the CN; he can simply pretend 
to be a router by stealing the default router’s link-layer 
address and sending a fake router advertisement to the CN. 
Alternatively, he can send a Neighbor Discovery redirect 
message to the CN requesting that all its traffic be sent 
to his link-layer address. Thus, an attacker sharing a link 
with the CN can cause serious harm without Mobile IPv6; 
that is, Neighbor Discovery messages are the weakest link 
when an attacker is sharing a link with the CN 
[Nikander05]. 
Since the main goal of the RR procedure is to ensure 
that securing route optimization does not make things worse 
than they are in today’s Internet, the above case can be 
ignored. However, it is worth noting that this type of 
attack will become significant as soon as a mechanism is 
devised to secure Neighbor Discovery messages. When this 
happens, the RR procedure will become the weakest link 
[Soliman04]. 
An attacker can be located on the mobile node–CN path. 
In this location, he would only be able to see the care-of 
keygen token, which would not allow him to construct Kbm 
correctly to steal the mobile node’s traffic. 
The attacker might also send a large number of HOTI 
and COTI messages to try to consume the CN’s resources in a 
way that makes it unable to process legitimate requests 
from real mobile nodes. The RR procedure is designed to 
allow CNs to be protected from memory-exhaustion attacks; a 
CN would only keep state when it receives an authenticated 
binding update from a mobile node. Clearly, this procedure 
cannot protect against an attacker aiming at using up the 
CN’s link bandwidth by sending a very large number of 
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HOTI/COTI messages. However, this attack can be launched 
without RR by simply sending a large number of bogus 
messages. It is worth noting though, that the CN can simply 
decide to not receive any HOTI/COTI messages if it detects 
that it is being attacked. That is, the CN can “turn off” 
route optimization; communication with mobile nodes will 
still take place through the home agent [Soliman04]. 
Moreover, it is assumed that CN is able to implement 
the RR algorithm and maintain a cache of MNs. 
One of the most important advantages of the RR 
procedure is that it does not require any manual 
configuration or infrastructure support. This feature 
assists with the quick deployment of Mobile IPv6 and 
encourages vendors to support route optimization, which 
would have been much harder if route optimization came with 
the burden of infrastructure support or the unrealistic 
assumption of manual configuration. However, it is 
important to note that this comes at the cost of having 
weak authentication compared to the more traditional 
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III. MIPV6 TEST BED CONFIGURATION 
This chapter presents the layout and configuration 
process of the implemented MIPv6 test bed. A very limited 
number of published host operating systems are advertised 
to have support for MIPv6. Worse, all the available MIPv6 
capable OS releases are experimental in nature and yet 
going through rigorous validation tests. As such a 
significant amount of effort for this thesis was spent 
determining a working combination of OS version and MIPv6 
extension, in a “trial and error” manner. The experience is 
documented in this chapter. 
This chapter is intended to provide sufficient details 
so that it can be used as a “how-to” guide for deploying a 
MIPv6 test bed using open-source software. 
A. PUBLISHED IMPLEMENTATIONS OF MIPV6 
The most known implementations of MIPv6 are: “MIPL” 
(Mobile IPv6 for Linux [http://www.mipl.mediapoli.com/ Last 
visited on January 10, 2007]), “KAME” project (Mobile IPv6 
for BSD based Oss [http://www.kame.net Last visited on 
January 11, 2007]) and “USAGI” (Mobile IPv6 for Linux based 
Oss [http://www.linux-ipv6.org/ Last visited on February 8, 
2007]). 
Mobile IPv6 for Linux (MIPL) is an implementation that 
was originally developed as part of a software project 
course in the Helsinki University of Technology (HUT), with 
the goal to create a prototype implementation of Mobile 
IPv6 for Linux. After the course, the implementation was 
further developed in the context of the GO/Core project at 
HUT Telecommunications and Multimedia Lab. It is an open 
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source implementation, released under the GNU GPL license 
and freely available to anyone(http://www.mobile-
ipv6.org/software/ ). The MIPL implementation has been 
tested in interoperability and conformance testing events 
such as the ETSI IPv6 Plugtests and TAHI Interoperability 
events. 
The "KAME" and "USAGI", projects are working on 
research and development on the implementation of the IPv6 
and IPsec protocols, which operates on BSD based OSs for 
the "KAME" project and on a Linux based OS for the "USAGI" 
project. Accuracy of the implementation is now widely 
accepted and is being incorporated into BSD based OSs 
(FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD and BSD/OS) and Linux version 2.6 
for the provision of an environment enabling the easy use 
of IPv6 to a large number of users 
[http://www.wide.ad.jp/about/research.html Last visited on 
January 15, 2007]. 
The “KAME” project was a joint effort of six companies 
in Japan to provide a free suite of IPv6, IPsec, and Mobile 
IPv6 protocols for BSD variants. Particularly, a mobile 
IPv6 implementation for the FreeBSD and NetBSD platforms 
has been developed under this project. The code is 
implemented as part of the kernel. In addition, several 
user space programs have been developed for MIPv6 control, 
for extracting MIPv6 statistics and for dynamic home agent 
discovery. The implementation follows RFC 3775 and includes 
functionality for HA, MN and CN (mandatory for an IPv6 
implementation that claims to be IPv6 compliant). It also 
supports authentication of messages between a MN and its HA 
using IPsec [M. Dunmore, “Final MIPv6 Support Guide,”  
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February 8 2005, 6net, 
[http://www.6net.org/publications/deliverables/D4.1.4.pdf 
Last visited on January 15, 2007]. 
The “USAGI” Project (UniverSAl playGround for IPv6 
Project) aims to provide a better IPv6 environment for 
Linux in conjunction with the WIDE, KAME, and TAHI 
projects. It includes Linux kernel extensions, IPv6 related 
libraries, and IPv6 applications.  
The “TAHI” project [http://www.tahi.org/ Last visited 
on February 22, 2007] is aiming at providing a means of 
high-level verification of these technologies. 
B. CHOOSING MIPV6 SOFTWARE 
In the beginning, the FreeBSD OS developed by the KAME 
project was chosen for the MIPv6 test bed. The main reason 
for this choice was that all MIPv6 functionality was 
included in the OS kernel and no patch was required. 
Following the instructions for a similar project based on 
the 4.9 Version of FreebSD [Lawrence04] and using the 
current version (6.2) as well as the detailed instructions 
of [Blanchet06] it was made an attempt to configure and 
build a MIPv6 test bed. However, this attempt was 
unsuccessful. During my research, there were contradictory 
information about the compatibility and functionality of 
the current version with the Mobile IPv6 functionality. 
Pressed by time, a decision was made to switch and use a 
Linux OS and the MIPL implementation. 
Specifically, SUSE Linux 10.1 was used and the 
experience suggested that the Linux option has several 
advantages over the FreeBSD option: 
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1. SUSE Linux has a very well-designed and full-
featured system configuration tool, YAST, which 
is a complete control center for system 
administration. SUSE Linux proved to be easy to 
install and configure it in depth during the 
installation time. Moreover, Novell, the company 
behind SUSE, offers great on-line technical 
support and documentation. 
2. Under Linux whenever a software module was needed 
for the test bed, the only thing to do was to 
invoke YAST to search and verify if the module 
(called package in Linux) was installed or not. 
If it wasn’t, a simple mouse click on the module 
was sufficient and YAST assumed the 
responsibility to install, configure and resolve 
all dependencies automatically. 
3. The MIPL project was the most recent release for 
MIPv6 implementation (released on 14 June 2006) 
and fully RFC 3775 compliant. 
C. TEST BED DESCRIPTION 
1.  Test Bed Layout Description 
The implemented network test bed consists of five 
computers. Two of them assume the roles of the CN and MN 
respectively. The other three are configured as IPv6 
capable routers. PC-based software router implementation is 
used instead of commercial IPv6 routers in order to have 
more flexibility for the addition of new IPv6 features and 
fine tuning of network parameters such as the router 
advertisements’ intervals [M. Dunmore (6net) Final MIPv6 
Support Guide February 8, 2005]. Table 1 presents the main 
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Table 1.   Hardware Characteristics of MIPv6 Test bed 
Components 
 
All the components of the network are connected via 
Netgear dual speed hubs (model DS104) running at 10 Mbps so 
as to facilitate packet sniffing for debugging purposes. 
Handoffs between networks for the MN are simulated by 
unplugging the Ethernet cable to which the MN is currently 
attached and replace it with a cable from the network we 
wish to move into. 





Figure 3.   Physical Layout of MIPv6 Test bed 
 
The home network of the mobile node (MN) is the 
2003::/64. The home agent (HA) is installed on the HA 
router. The home network of the CN is the 2001::/64. During 
the experiments, the MN was moved between the home network 
and a foreign network, 2005::/64 which is advertised by the 
Frouter. 
All systems run the boxed distribution SUSE 10.1 as 
their OS with Linux kernel 2.6.16.13-4 except the HA, the 
MN and the CN which have been recompiled with Linux kernel 
2.6.16 patched with the MIPv6-2.0.2-linux-2.6.16.patch to 
provide the Mobile IPv6 features. The OS and the patch were 
downloaded from  
ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/linux-



















In Table 2 are presented the interfaces of the 
Components of the test bed network along with their MAC and 
IP addresses. 
 
Node Interface MAC IP address 
HA eth0 00:04:75:b5:a6:32 2003::2 
  eth1 00:0b:db:25:69:61 2004::2 
  eth2 00:40:f4:5f:a9:13 2002::2 
MN eth0 00:12:3f:ae:20:5b 2003::1 
CNrouter eth0 00:0a:5e:00:49:1b 2002::1 
  eth1 00:0b:db:25:73:68 2000::1 
  eth2 00:40:f4:5a:5b:cc 2001::1 
Frouter eth0 00:08:74:41:5e:3f 2004::3 
  eth1 00:09:5b:0a:5d:b3 2005::3 
CN eth0 00:12:3f:ae:21:c2 2001::8 
Table 2.   Test Bed IP and MAC Addresses 
 
2. Configure-Patch-Build and Install the MIPv6 
Kernel at HA, MN and CN 
For the configuration of the implemented MIPv6 network 
components (HA, MN and CN), the following excellent 
tutorials were used:  
• “How To Compile A Kernel - The SuSE Way,” 
[http://www.howtoforge.com/kernel_compilation_suse 
Last visited on February 2, 2007]. 
• “Linux Mobile IPv6 HOWTO,” 
[http://gnist.org/~lars/doc/Mobile-IPv6-
HOWTO/Mobile-IPv6-HOWTO.html Last visited on 
February 10, 2007]. 
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• “Mobile IPv6 Mini HOWTO,” 
[http://www.ipt.etsi.org/mini_howto.htm Last 
visited on February 12, 2007]. 
The first site describes the procedure of compiling a 
kernel on SuSE systems. It describes how to build a custom 
kernel using the latest unmodified kernel sources from 
[http://www.kernel.org/ (vanilla kernel) so that the user 
could be independent from the kernels supplied by his 
distribution.  
Another reason for choosing this tutorial was because 
its goal was to build a kernel rpm package that could be 
used not only for installation of the MIPv6 capable kernel 
on the specific system, but also on the other SuSE systems 
that are used in the test bed and demand the same 
configuration.  
The tutorial also shows how to patch the kernel 
sources if additional features are needed, like the MIPv6 
patch for the Mobile IPv6 functionalities. 
More specifically, the following steps were followed 
to install and patch a Linux kernel. (The tutorial provides 
more detailed screenshots of the installation.) 
a. Install ncurses-devel which will be needed by the 
make menuconfig command which will be used later 
on: 
# yast -i ncurses-devel 
 
b. Modify a few tools that will be needed to build 
the new kernel: 
# cp /usr/lib/rpm/find-provides.ksyms 
/usr/lib/rpm/find-provides.ksyms_orig 
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# cp /usr/lib/rpm/find-requires.ksyms 
/usr/lib/rpm/find-requires.ksyms_orig 
# cp /usr/lib/rpm/find-supplements.ksyms 
/usr/lib/rpm/find-supplements.ksyms_orig 
 
c. Open each of these scripts and replace  
kernel-*)  is_kernel_package=1;; with 
kernel*)  is_kernel_package=1 : 
# vi /usr/lib/rpm/find-provides.ksyms 
# vi /usr/lib/rpm/find-requires.ksyms 
# vi /usr/lib/rpm/find-supplements.ksyms  
Next, move to /usr/src in order to download the 
desired kernel (2.6.16) to /usr/src directory. 
# cd /usr/src 
 
d. Go to http://www.kernel.org/ and select the 
desired for installation kernel, in this case, 
linux-2.6.16.tar.bz2. The Kernel can be 
downloaded to directory /usr/src like this: 
# wget http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/ 
linux-2.6.16.tar.bz2 
 
e. Unpack the kernel sources and create a symlink 
linux to the kernel sources directory: 
# tar xjf linux-2.6.16.tar.bz2 
# ln -s linux-2.6.16 linux 
Check that the linux is symlinked with the 
desired Kernel: 
# ls –l 
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It should be seen: linuxÆlinux-2.6.16. If the 
linux is still connected with the previous 
kernel, implement the commands: 
# rm linux 
# ln -s linux-2.6.16 linux 
 
f. Change directory and download the patch found in 
http://mobile-ipv6.org/software/download/mipv6-
2.0.2-linux-2.6.16.patch.gz to the Kernel source 
and uncompress it: 




g. Move again to /usr/src/linux in order to test the 
patch before apply it: 
# cd /usr/src/linux 
# zcat /usr/local/src/mipv6-2.0.2-linux-2.6.16.patch.gz 
| patch -p1 --dry-run 
This command is just a test, it does nothing 
to sources. If it doesn't show errors, the 
following command should be executed which 
actually applies the patch. Don't do it if the 
first command shows errors: 
# zcat /usr/local/src/mipv6-2.0.2-linux-2.6.16.patch.gz 







h. Configure The Kernel 
The configuration of the current working 
kernel will be used as a basis for the new 
kernel. The existing configuration is copied 
to /usr/src/linux: 
# make mrproper 
# cp /boot/config-`uname -r` ./.config 
 
i. Run 
# make menuconfig 
This command brings up the kernel 
configuration menu. Go to Load an Alternate 
Configuration File and choose .config (which 
contains the configuration of the current 
working kernel) as the configuration file. 
Then browse through the kernel configuration 
menu and make your choices. Make sure that you 
get inside NetworkingÆ and load all the 
necessary functionalities of MIPv6. I chose 
them all. Make sure a kernel version 
identification string is specified, under 
General Setup ---> (-default) Local version - 
append to kernel release (in my configuration 
I named it MIPv6). 
j. When this step is finished, select Exit and 
answer the following question (Do you wish to 




k. Install the user space MIPv6 tool. Change 
directory (/usr/local/src), download the latest 
Linux MIPv6 source code (mipv6-2.0.2) from 
http://mobile-ipv6.org/software/download/mipv6-
2.0.2.tar.gz and uncompress it: 
# cd /usr/local/src 
# wget http://mobile-ipv6.org/software/download/mipv6-
2.0.2.tar.gz 
# tar zxfv mipv6-2.0.2.tar.gz 
 
l. Change directory: 
 
# cd mipv6-2.0.2 
 
m. Configure, compile and install the source code 
including the --enable-vt option to configure, 
which will enable a virtual terminal listening on 
localhost port 7777 and can be used later on to 
provide with helpful information. 
# CPPFLAGS=-I/usr/src/linux/include ./configure --
enable-vt 
# make 
# make install 
 
n. Before the kernel is being built, it is of vital 
importance to check if it is MIPv6 ready. There 
are two ways to verify it: 
The first one is to go to directory that you 
have installed the MIPv6 user space source 
code 
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# cd /usr/local/src/mipv6-2.0.2 
and execute the following command: 
# ./chkconf_kernel.sh  /usr/src/linux 
If the response is the following: 
Checking kernel configuration... 
Using /usr/src/linux/.config 
All kernel options are as they should. 
a correct configuration has taken place. 
Otherwise, make the corrections suggested and 
continue. 
Another way to check if the configuration is 
correct is to use an editor 
(vi,pico,gedit,etc) and verify that in the 
.config file in /user/src/linux, the following 















The Mobile Node also needs:  
CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES=y 
CONFIG_ARPD=y 
In case that IPSec is desired to be enabled, 





o. Build the kernel, simply executing this command: 
# make rpm 
 
p. Install The New Kernel 
After the successful kernel build, a src.rpm 
and an rpm package have been created. The 
src.rpm package can be found in the 
/usr/src/packages/SRPMS/ directory. Verify its name 
by running: 
# ls -l /usr/src/packages/SRPMS/ 
On my system it was called: 
kernel-2.6.16MIPv6-1.src.rpm. 
The rpm package can be found, depending on the 






On my system it was located in 
/usr/src/packages/RPMS/i386/, and by running 
# ls -l /usr/src/packages/RPMS/i386/ 
I found out that its name was: 
kernel-2.6.16MIPv6-1.i386.rpm.  
 
q. Install the kernel rpm package like this: 
# cd /usr/src/packages/RPMS/i386/ 
# rpm -ivh kernel-2.6.16MIPv6-1.i386.rpm 
(The created kernel rpm package can be 
transferred and installed to other SuSE 
systems without having to compile the kernel 
there again.)  
 
r. Create a ramdisk for the new kernel, because 
otherwise the system will most likely not boot 
our new kernel: 
# mkinitrd 
(This command will create new ramdisks for all 
installed kernels.) 
 
s. Configure the GRUB boot loader so that the new 
kernel gets booted when the system is restarted. 
Instead of modifying /boot/grub/menu.lst 
directly, run yast to do it. 
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# yast 
Go to System -> Boot Loader: 
On the next screen you will be seen the new 
existing GRUB records. Go to Add to add a new 
one: Select Clone Selected Section to clone 
one of the working GRUB records: 
Enter a name for the new kernel, e.g. SUSE 
Linux 2.6.16-MIPv6, and go to Kernel -> 
Browse: 
The contents of the /boot directory and the 
location of the new kernel are visible. Select 
the new kernel which typically begins with 
vmlinuz (in my case vmlinuz-2.6.16-MIPv6) 
Next, go to Initial RAM Disk -> Browse:  
See the contents of the /boot directory. 
Select the appropriate ramdisk for the new 
kernel which typically begins with initrd 
(e.g. initrd-2.6.16-MIPv6). 
A new GRUB record for the new kernel will be 
seen. Mark it and hit Up until it is the first 
in the list. Then hit Set as Default to make 
the new kernel the default one, hit Finish and 
Select Quit to leave YaST: Now reboot the 
system: 
# shutdown -r now 
If everything goes well, it should come up 
with the new kernel. Check the version of the 
kernel by running: 
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# uname -r 
This should display something like: 
2.6.16MIPv6 (The name that the user gave to 
the kernel). 
3. Setup of HA, MN, CN, and routers  
a. HA 
The HA is a router with additional 
functionalities which enable it to be the HA of the MN in 
the test bed network. Issue the following commands, since 
HA is a router: 
# echo 1 >/proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/forwarding 
# echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/autoconf 
# echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_ra 
# echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_redirects 
IPv6 routing was established by Zebra software 
which manages TCP/IP based routing protocols. 
Zebra had been chosen because, unlike traditional 
monolithic architectures, and even the so-called "new 
modular architectures" that remove the burden of processing 
routing functions from the cpu utilizing special ASIC 
chips; it instead offers true modularity. 
Zebra is unique in its design in that it has a 
process for each protocol [http://www.zebra.org/what.html] 
Ripng (RIP next generation) was chosen to be the routing 
protocol for the IPv6 tesbed, provided by ripngd deamon, 
which provides IPv6 routing services in accordance with the 
configuration file ripngd.conf. 
The daemons zebra and ripngd are activated by 
issuing the commands: 
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# /etc/init.d/ripngd start 
# /etc/init.d/zebra start 
The router advertisement daemon (radvd) is run by 
Linux or BSD systems acting as IPv6 routers. It sends 
Router Advertisement messages, specified by RFC 2461, to a 
local Ethernet LAN periodically and when requested by a 
node sending a Router Solicitation message. These messages 
are required for IPv6 stateless autoconfiguration. In order 
for the MN to be able to discover when it returns home, the 
HA must be configured to send out router advertisements. 
Router Advertisements were implemented via the radvd daemon 
which provides Router Advertisement services in accordance 
with the configuration file radvd.conf. 
The daemon radvd is activated by issuing the 
command: 
# /etc/init.d/radvd start 
The user can verify that RAs are being sent by 
running: 
# radvdump 
Authentication and authorization of Mobile IPv6 
messages between the MN and HA with IPsec is possible in 
2.6.16 kernel. In order to provide IPsec between the 
binding messages of the HA and the MN, sa.conf file was 
created. In order to activate the Security Association in 
both the HA and MN, ipsec-tools should have been installed 
using Yast and implement the following command after 
editing the file sa.conf: 
# setkey –f /etc/sa.conf 
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The functionality of MIPv6 is provided by the 
daemon mip6d, based in the configuration file mip6d.conf. 
In case that a service is not provided, the user 
can always find the location of the daemon and run it 
locally. For example:  
# whereis mip6d 
mip6d:/etc/mip6d.conf /usr/local/sbin/mip6d 
That means that the location of the daemon is at 
/usr/local/sbin/mip6d. We change directory: 
# cd /usr/local/sbin 
Now the daemon can be run locally: 
 
 
Exact copy of the files of the HA can be found in 
Appendix A. 
b. MN 
The MN is a host at which only the mip6d daemon 
should be run. It is provided manually with its global IPv6 
address and the necessary configurations: 
 
# ifconfig eth0 inet6 add 2003::1/64 
# echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/forwarding 
# echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/autoconf 
# echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/accept_ra 
# echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/accept_redirects 
# route –A inet6 add default gw 2003::2 
 
 
Host_Name:/usr/local/sbin# ./mip6d start 
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Note that MN host will be given an additional 
IPv6 address based on the HA’s prefix and its MAC address. 
MN needs also the file sa.conf which should be positioned 
in /etc/ directory. Exact copy of the files of the MN can 
be found in Appendix B. 
c. CN 
CN is an IPv6 host at which only the mip6d daemon 
should be run. It is provided manually with its global IPv6 
address and the necessary configurations: 
# ifconfig eth0 inet6 add 2001::8/64 
# echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/forwarding 
# echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/autoconf 
# echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/accept_ra 
# echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/eth0/accept_redirects 
# route –A inet6 add default gw 2001::1 
Note that CN host will be given an additional 
IPv6 address based on the CNrouter’s prefix and its MAC 
address. It does not need the file sa.conf. Exact copy of 
the files of the CN can be found in Appendix C. 
d. CNrouter 
The CNrouter is an IPv6 router. 
Issue the following commands, since CNrouter is a 
router: 
# echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/forwarding 
# echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/autoconf 
# echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_ra 
# echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/ipv6/conf/all/accept_redirects 
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As with HA, IPv6 routing was established by Zebra 
software and ripngd daemon, which also assign IPv6 
addresses to the interfaces of the router along with radvd 
daemon. Moreover RAs are managed via radvd daemon and can 
be verified by radvdump command. An exact copy of the files 
of the CNrouter can be found in Appendix D. 
e. Frouter 
The Frouter is an IPv6 router. Its configuration 
follows the principles of CNrouter. An exact copy of the 
files of the Frouter can be found in Appendix E. 
D. VERIFYING THE CONFIGURATION 
In order to verify the MIPv6 network configuration the 
following scenario, divided into three phases, has been 
enacted: 
• Phase 1: MN resides in its Home Network (attached 
to the 2003::/64 link). 
• Phase 2: MN moves to a Foreign Network 
(2005::/64) and acquires a new CoA. 
• Phase 3: MN returns to the Home Network. 
The above scenario was performed with and without 
using IPsec between the HA and the MN. 
The procedure that will be followed in order to 
observe the RR is that the MN will start ping the CN from 
its Home Network and then follow Phases 2 and 3. 
The tools that will be used to verify the 
configuration are: 
• “Sniffers” at the links HA-MN, HA-FRouter, 





• Virtual terminal (# telnet local host 7777) at 
the MIPv6 capable nodes, which provide the user 
with information about the binding caches and the 
binding update lists at them (HA, MN and the CN): 
• The following debugging commands (at the MN) may 
be used to provide the user with ad hoc debugging 
information: 
# watch ifconfig eth0 
# watch route -A inet6 
# tcpdump -i eth0 -vv ip6 or proto ipv6 
In order to be able to follow better the RR procedure 
the following table which describes very briefly the types 
of mobile headers and the routing of messages. 
MOBILITY HEADER Message SENDERÆRECEIVER 
MH Type 1 HOTI MN to CN via HA 
MH Type 2 COTI MN to CN 
MH Type 3 HOT  CN to MN via HA 
MH Type 4 COT CN to MN 
MH Type 5 BU  MN to HA or 
MN to CN 
MH Type 6 BA  HA to MN or 
HA to CN 
Table 3.   Table of Mobility Header Types 
 
1. Scenario without the Use of IPsec 
a. Phase 1: MN Is At Its Home Network 
Mobile IPv6 is being started in all nodes with 
the following order: HA, MN, CN, being in the directory 
that mip6d resides, executing the following command: 
#./mip6d –c /etc/mip6d.conf  
The output of the predefined execution at HA and 
MN nodes are shown in Figures 4 and 5: 
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HArouter:/usr/local/sbin # ./mip6d -c /etc/mip6d.conf 
mip6d[12901]: MIPL Mobile IPv6 for Linux v2.0.2 started (Home Agent(1)) 
main: MIPL Mobile IPv6 for Linux started in debug mode, not detaching 
from terminal 
conf_show: config_file = /etc/mip6d.conf (2) 
conf_show: vt_hostname = localhost 
conf_show: vt_service = 7777 
conf_show: mip6_entity = 2 
conf_show: debug_level = 10 
conf_show: PolicyModulePath = [internal] 
conf_show: DefaultBindingAclPolicy = 0 
conf_show: NonVolatileBindingCache = disabled 
conf_show: KeyMngMobCapability = disabled 
conf_show: UseMnHaIPsec = disabled (3) 
conf_show: MnMaxHaBindingLife = 262140 
conf_show: MnMaxCnBindingLife = 420 
conf_show: MnRouterProbes = 0 
conf_show: MnRouterProbeTimeout = 0.000000 
conf_show: InitialBindackTimeoutFirstReg = 1.500000 
conf_show: InitialBindackTimeoutReReg = 1.000000 
conf_show: UseCnBuAck = enabled 
conf_show: DoRouteOptimizationMN = enabled (4) 
conf_show: MnUseAllInterfaces = disabled 
conf_show: MnDiscardHaParamProb = disabled 
conf_show: SendMobPfxSols = enabled 
conf_show: OptimisticHandoff = disabled 
conf_show: SendMobPfxAdvs = enabled 
conf_show: SendUnsolMobPfxAdvs = enabled 
conf_show: MaxMobPfxAdvInterval = 86400 
conf_show: MinMobPfxAdvInterval = 600 
conf_show: HaMaxBindingLife = 262140 
conf_show: DoRouteOptimizationCN = enabled (5) 
xfrm_cn_init: Adding policies and states for CN 
xfrm_ha_init: Adding policies and states for HA 
ha_if_addr_setup: Joined anycast group 2003:0:0:0:fdff:ffff:ffff:fffe 
on iface 8 
Figure 4.   Running Output of HA mip6d when MN is at Home 
Network 
 
Important information from the output of HA 
mip6d: 
(1)  The node is a Home Agent. 
(2)  The configuration file is the /etc/mip6d.conf 
(3)  IPsec is not enabled 
(4)  RO is enabled between HA and MN 
(5)  RO is enabled between HA and CN 
It follows the output of the MN mip6d: 
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MN2:/usr/local/sbin # ./mip6d -c /etc/mip6d.conf 
mip6d[16697]: MIPL Mobile IPv6 for Linux v2.0.2 started (Mobile Node(1)
) 
main: MIPL Mobile IPv6 for Linux started in debug mode, not detaching 
from terminal 
conf_show: config_file = /etc/mip6d.conf (2) 
conf_show: vt_hostname = localhost 
conf_show: vt_service = 7777 
conf_show: mip6_entity = 1 
conf_show: debug_level = 10 
conf_show: PolicyModulePath = [internal] 
conf_show: DefaultBindingAclPolicy = 0 
conf_show: NonVolatileBindingCache = disabled 
conf_show: KeyMngMobCapability = disabled 
conf_show: UseMnHaIPsec = disabled (3) 
conf_show: MnMaxHaBindingLife = 262140 
conf_show: MnMaxCnBindingLife = 420 
conf_show: MnRouterProbes = 0 
conf_show: MnRouterProbeTimeout = 0.000000 
conf_show: InitialBindackTimeoutFirstReg = 1.500000 
conf_show: InitialBindackTimeoutReReg = 1.000000 
conf_show: UseCnBuAck = enabled 
conf_show: DoRouteOptimizationMN = enabled (4) 
conf_show: MnUseAllInterfaces = disabled 
conf_show: MnDiscardHaParamProb = disabled 
conf_show: SendMobPfxSols = enabled 
conf_show: OptimisticHandoff = disabled 
conf_show: SendMobPfxAdvs = enabled 
conf_show: SendUnsolMobPfxAdvs = enabled 
conf_show: MaxMobPfxAdvInterval = 86400 
conf_show: MinMobPfxAdvInterval = 600 
conf_show: HaMaxBindingLife = 262140 
conf_show: DoRouteOptimizationCN = enabled (5) 
xfrm_cn_init: Adding policies and states for CN 
xfrm_mn_init: Adding policies and states for MN 
conf_home_addr_info: HoA address 2003:0:0:0:0:0:0:1 
conf_home_addr_info: HA address 2003:0:0:0:0:0:0:2 
__tunnel_add: created tunnel ip6tnl1 (21) from 2003:0:0:0:0:0:0:1 to 
2003:0:0:0:0:0:0:2 user count 1 (6) 
conf_home_addr_info: Home address 2003:0:0:0:0:0:0:1 
flag_hoa: set HoA 2003:0:0:0:0:0:0:1/128 iif 21 flags 10 preferred_time 
4294967295 valid_time 4294967295 
conf_home_addr_info: Added new home_addr_info successfully 
__md_discover_router: discover link on iface eth0 (6) 
md_change_default_router: add new router fe80:0:0:0:204:75ff:feb5:a632 
on interface eth0 (6) 
mn_addr_do_dad: DAD succeeded! 
mn_move: 1535 
mn_move: in home net (7) 
mv_hoa: move HoA 2003:0:0:0:0:0:0:1/64 from iface 21 to 6 
md_change_default_router: add new router fe80:0:0:0:204:75ff:feb5:a632 
on interface eth0 (6) 
md_expire_router: expiring router 
fe80:0:0:0:204:75ff:feb5:a632 on iface eth0 (6) 
Figure 5.   Running Output of MN mip6d when MN is at Home 
Network 
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Important information from the output of HA mip6d 
daemon: 
(1)  The node is a Mobile Node 
(2)  The configuration file is the /etc/mip6d.conf 
(3)  IPsec is not enabled 
(4)  RO is enabled between HA and MN 
(5)  RO is enabled between HA and CN 
(6)  A tunnel has been created between HA and MN 
(7)  MN is at Home Network 
Issuing the command  
#ifconfig –a 
at the MN, provides the output illustrated at Figure 6, 
proving that the tunnel (ip6tnl1) is up and ready for 
connections. 
MN2:/etc # ifconfig -a 
eth0      Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 00:12:3F:AE:20:5B 
          inet6 addr: 2003::1/64 Scope:Global (1) 
          inet6 addr: 2003::212:3fff:feae:205b/64 Scope:Global (2) 
          inet6 addr: fe80::212:3fff:feae:205b/64 Scope:Link 
          UP BROADCAST NOTRAILERS RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1 
          RX packets:155202 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:6 
          TX packets:28259 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0 
          collisions:9 txqueuelen:1000 
          RX bytes:19807002 (18.8 Mb)  TX bytes:3921682 (3.7 Mb) 
          Interrupt:169 
 
gre0      Link encap:UNSPEC  HWaddr 00-00-00-00-20-5B-00-00-00-00-00-
00-00-00-00-00 
          NOARP  MTU:1476  Metric:1 
          RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0 
          TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0 
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:0 
          RX bytes:0 (0.0 b)  TX bytes:0 (0.0 b) 
 
ip6tnl0   Link encap:UNSPEC  HWaddr 00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-
00-00-00-00-00 
          NOARP  MTU:1460  Metric:1 
          RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0 
          TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0 
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:0 
          RX bytes:0 (0.0 b)  TX bytes:0 (0.0 b) 
 
ip6tnl1   Link encap:UNSPEC  HWaddr 20-03-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-
00-00-00-00-00 
          inet6 addr: fe80::212:3fff:feae:205b/64 Scope:Link 
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          UP POINTOPOINT RUNNING NOARP  MTU:1460  Metric:1 
          RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0 
          TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0 
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:0 
          RX bytes:0 (0.0 b)  TX bytes:0 (0.0 b) 
 
lo        Link encap:Local Loopback 
          inet addr:127.0.0.1  Mask:255.0.0.0 
          inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host 
          UP LOOPBACK RUNNING  MTU:16436  Metric:1 
          RX packets:1598 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0 
          TX packets:1598 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0 
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:0 
          RX bytes:127230 (124.2 Kb)  TX bytes:127230 (124.2 Kb) 
 
sit0      Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4 
          NOARP  MTU:1480  Metric:1 
          RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0 
          TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0 
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:0 
          RX bytes:0 (0.0 b)  TX bytes:0 (0.0 b) 
 
tunl0     Link encap:IPIP Tunnel  HWaddr 
          NOARP  MTU:1480  Metric:1 
          RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0 
          TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0 
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:0 
          RX bytes:0 (0.0 b)  TX bytes:0 (0.0 b) 
Figure 6.   Running Output MN ifconfig when MN is at Home 
Network 
 
Last, we start the mip6d daemon to the CN with 
the following output (Figure 7): 
 
CN2:/usr/local/sbin # ./mip6d -c /etc/mip6d.conf 
mip6d[31550]: MIPL Mobile IPv6 for Linux v2.0.2 started (Correspondent 
Node) 
main: MIPL Mobile IPv6 for Linux started in debug mode, not detaching 
from terminal 
conf_show: config_file = /etc/mip6d.conf 
conf_show: vt_hostname = localhost 
conf_show: vt_service = 7777 
conf_show: mip6_entity = 0 
conf_show: debug_level = 10 
conf_show: PolicyModulePath = [internal] 
conf_show: DefaultBindingAclPolicy = 0 
conf_show: NonVolatileBindingCache = disabled 
conf_show: KeyMngMobCapability = disabled 
conf_show: UseMnHaIPsec = enabled 
conf_show: MnMaxHaBindingLife = 262140 
conf_show: MnMaxCnBindingLife = 420 
conf_show: MnRouterProbes = 0 
conf_show: MnRouterProbeTimeout = 0.000000 
conf_show: InitialBindackTimeoutFirstReg = 1.500000 
conf_show: InitialBindackTimeoutReReg = 1.000000 
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conf_show: UseCnBuAck = enabled 
conf_show: DoRouteOptimizationMN = enabled 
conf_show: MnUseAllInterfaces = disabled 
conf_show: MnDiscardHaParamProb = disabled 
conf_show: SendMobPfxSols = enabled 
conf_show: OptimisticHandoff = disabled 
conf_show: SendMobPfxAdvs = enabled 
conf_show: SendUnsolMobPfxAdvs = enabled 
conf_show: MaxMobPfxAdvInterval = 86400 
conf_show: MinMobPfxAdvInterval = 600 
conf_show: HaMaxBindingLife = 262140 
conf_show: DoRouteOptimizationCN = enabled 
xfrm_cn_init: Adding policies and states for CN 
Figure 7.   Running Output CN mip6d when MN is at Home 
Network 
Figure 8 shows the kernel IP routing table of MN. 
It will be shown that the default route will be changed in 
the next phase (after the MN moves to the Foreign Network). 
 
MN2:/etc/init.d # route -A inet6 
Kernel IPv6 routing table 
Destination                   Next Hop                    Flags Metric Ref    Use Iface 
2001::/64                     2003::2                     UG    1024   9810     0 eth0 
2003::/64                     ::                          U     256    109      0 eth0 
fe80::/64                     ::                          U     256    0        0 ip6tnl1 
fe80::/64                     ::                          U     256    0        0 eth0 
ff02::1/128                   ff02::1                     UC    0      106      0 eth0 
ff00::/8                      ::                          U     256    0        0 eth0 
ff00::/8                      ::                          U     256    0        0 ip6tnl1 
::/0                          fe80::204:75ff:feb5:a632    UGDA  1024   0        0 eth0 
::1/128                       ::                          U     0      21       1 lo 
2003::1/128                   ::                          U     0      175      1 lo 
2003::212:3fff:feae:205b/128  ::                          U     0      0        1 lo 
fe80::212:3fff:feae:205b/128  ::                          U     0      0        1 lo 
fe80::212:3fff:feae:205b/128  ::                          U     0      1        1 lo 
 




b. Phase 2: MN Moves to a Foreign Network 
 
 
Figure 9.   MN Moved to Foreign Network 2005::/64 
 
When the MN detects that the default router (HA) 
cannot be reached, the MN sends out a Router Solicitation 
and the Foreign Router interface, where the MN has been 
attached, responds with its prefix. The MN reconfigures 
itself, creating a new IPv6 address, using the prefix of 
the Foreign Router and its MAC address (1) and its HoA 
appears in the created ip6tnl1 (2) , as shown in Figure 10. 
 
MN2:/home/ikandira # ifconfig -a 
eth0      Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 00:12:3F:AE:20:5B 
          inet6 addr: 2005::212:3fff:feae:205b/64 Scope:Global 
          inet6 addr: fe80::212:3fff:feae:205b/64 Scope:Link 
          UP BROADCAST NOTRAILERS RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1 
          RX packets:158180 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:7 
          TX packets:30770 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0 
          collisions:9 txqueuelen:1000 
          RX bytes:20214758 (19.2 Mb)  TX bytes:4270328 (4.0 Mb) 
          Interrupt:169 
 
gre0      Link encap:UNSPEC  HWaddr 00-00-00-00-20-5B-00-00-00-00-00-
00-00-00-00-00 
















          RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0 
          TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0 
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:0 
          RX bytes:0 (0.0 b)  TX bytes:0 (0.0 b) 
 
ip6tnl0   Link encap:UNSPEC  HWaddr 00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-
00-00-00-00-00 
          NOARP  MTU:1460  Metric:1 
          RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0 
          TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0 
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:0 
          RX bytes:0 (0.0 b)  TX bytes:0 (0.0 b) 
 
ip6tnl1   Link encap:UNSPEC  HWaddr 20-05-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-
00-00-00-00-00 
          inet6 addr: 2003::1/128 Scope:Global 
          inet6 addr: fe80::212:3fff:feae:205b/64 Scope:Link 
          UP POINTOPOINT RUNNING NOARP  MTU:1460  Metric:1 
          RX packets:21 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0 
          TX packets:20 errors:4 dropped:4 overruns:0 carrier:0 
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:0 
          RX bytes:1408 (1.3 Kb)  TX bytes:2016 (1.9 Kb) 
 
lo        Link encap:Local Loopback 
          inet addr:127.0.0.1  Mask:255.0.0.0 
          inet6 addr: ::1/128 Scope:Host 
          UP LOOPBACK RUNNING  MTU:16436  Metric:1 
          RX packets:1654 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0 
          TX packets:1654 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0 
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:0 
          RX bytes:132076 (128.9 Kb)  TX bytes:132076 (128.9 Kb) 
 
sit0      Link encap:IPv6-in-IPv4 
          NOARP  MTU:1480  Metric:1 
          RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0 
          TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0 
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:0 
          RX bytes:0 (0.0 b)  TX bytes:0 (0.0 b) 
 
tunl0     Link encap:IPIP Tunnel  HWaddr 
          NOARP  MTU:1480  Metric:1 
          RX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0 
          TX packets:0 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0 
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:0 
          RX bytes:0 (0.0 b)  TX bytes:0 (0.0 b) 
 
Figure 10.   ifconfig of MN moved to the Foreign Network 
 
After the MN acquires its new address (CoA), it 
informs its HA for its new CoA via a BU message and it 
receives a BA message, where the HA verifies that it is 
aware for the MN’s CoA. 
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Using the virtual terminal, it is observed that 
the HA has updated its binding cache (Figure 10) and the MN 
shows its binding update list (Figure 11): 
 
HArouter:/etc/init.d # telnet localhost 7777 
Trying 127.0.0.1... 
Connected to localhost. 
Escape character is '^]'. 
mip6d> help 
bc fancy hal nonce pl prompt quit thread verbose 
mip6d> verbose yes 
yes 
mip6d> bc 
hoa 2003:0:0:0:0:0:0:1 nonce 0 status registered 
 coa 2005:0:0:0:212:3fff:feae:205b nonce 0 flags AH-- 
 local 2003:0:0:0:0:0:0:2 tunnel ip6tnl1 link eth0 
 lifetime 11236 / 11992 seq 64365 unreach 0 mpa -96 / 657 retry 0 
mip6d> hal 
eth0 2003:0:0:0:0:0:0:2 
 preference 20 lifetime 10000 
mip6d> pl 
eth0 2003:0:0:0:0:0:0:2/64 
 valid 11998 / 12000 preferred 10000 flags OAR 
Figure 11.   Virtual Terminal Information Provided by HA 
 
MN2:/etc # telnet localhost 7777 
Trying 127.0.0.1... 
Connected to localhost. 
Escape character is '^]'. 
mip6d> help 
bc bul fancy nonce prompt quit rr verbose 
mip6d> verbose yes 
yes 
mip6d> bul 
== BUL_ENTRY == 
Home address    2003:0:0:0:0:0:0:1 
Care-of address 2005:0:0:0:212:3fff:feae:205b 
CN address      2003:0:0:0:0:0:0:2 
 lifetime = 11992,  delay = 11392000 
 flags: IP6_MH_BU_HOME IP6_MH_BU_ACK 
 ack ready 
 dev eth0 last_coa 2005:0:0:0:212:3fff:feae:205b 
 lifetime 11707 / 11992 seq 64365 resend 0 delay 11392(after 11108s) 
expires 11707 
 mps 10515 / 10797 
== BUL_ENTRY == 
Home address    2003:0:0:0:0:0:0:1 
Care-of address 2005:0:0:0:212:3fff:feae:205b 
CN address      2001:0:0:0:0:0:0:8 
 lifetime = 420,  delay = 420000 
 flags: IP6_MH_BU_ACK 
 ack ready RR state ready 
 dev eth0 last_coa 2005:0:0:0:212:3fff:feae:205b 
care-of nonce index 4home nonce index 4 
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== Return Routability Entry (HOT_ENTRY) == 
 HoA 2003:0:0:0:0:0:0:1 
 CN  2001:0:0:0:0:0:0:8 
 CoA 2005:0:0:0:212:3fff:feae:205b 
 Interface ip6tnl1 
 resend 0 delay 210 (after 36 seconds) expires in 36 seconds 
== Return Routability Entry (COT_ENTRY) == 
 CoA 2005:0:0:0:212:3fff:feae:205b 
 CN  2001:0:0:0:0:0:0:8 
 HoA 2003:0:0:0:0:0:0:1 
 Interface eth0 
 resend 0 delay 210 (after 36 seconds) expires in 36 seconds 
Figure 12.   Virtual Terminal Information Provided by MN 
 
Moreover, the MN is changing its default route to 
a tunnel (Figure 13). 
 
MN2:/etc/init.d # route -A inet6 
Kernel IPv6 routing table 
Destination                    Next Hop                Flags Metric Ref    Use Iface 
::/0                           ::                       U     128    0        0 ip6tnl1 
2001::8/128                    2001::8                  UC    0      69       0 ip6tnl1 
2003::2/128                    2003::2                  UC    0      2        1 ip6tnl1 
2001::/64                      2003::2                  UG    1024   9920     1 eth0 
2005::/64                      ::                       UA    256    18       0 eth0 
fe80::/64                      ::                       U     256    0        0 ip6tnl1 
fe80::/64                      ::                       U     256    0        0 eth0 
ff02::1/128                    ff02::1                  UC    0      19       0 eth0 
ff00::/8                       ::                       U     256    0        0 eth0 
ff00::/8                       ::                       U     256    0        0 ip6tnl1 
::/0                           fe80::209:5bff:fe0a:5db3 UGDA  1024   24       2 eth0 
::1/128                        ::                       U     0      21       1 lo 
2003::1/128                    ::                       U     0      71       1 lo 
2005::212:3fff:feae:205b/128   ::                       U     0      82       1 lo 
fe80::212:3fff:feae:205b/128   ::                       U     0      0        1 lo 
fe80::212:3fff:feae:205b/128   ::                       U     0      2        1 lo 
Figure 13.   MN Kernel IP Routing Table after Movement to 
Foreign Network  
 
As expected, since IPSec was not used, all the 
messages were captured from Wireshark on the link Frouter 





















Figure 18.   BU Message from MN(CoA) to CN  
 
 
Figure 19.   BA Message from CN to MN(CoA)  
63 
c. Phase 3: MN Returns to its Home Network 
The MN assumes that it returned to its Home 
Network, since it receives the router advertisement with 
the HA-bit set from the interface of the HA. The HA flushes 
its binding cache information. This can be seen from the 
virtual terminal of the HA (Figure 20). 
 
HArouter:/etc/init.d # telnet localhost 7777 
Trying 127.0.0.1... 
Connected to localhost. 
Escape character is '^]'. 
mip6d> help 




 preference 20 lifetime 10000 
mip6d> hal 
eth0 2003:0:0:0:0:0:0:2 
 preference 20 lifetime 10000 
mip6d> pl 
eth0 2003:0:0:0:0:0:0:2/64 
 valid 11999 / 12000 preferred 10000 flags OAR 
Figure 20.   HA Virtual Terminal Output  
 
2. Scenario with the Use of IPsec 
IPv6 was designed with security in mind from the 
outset, mandating the support of authentication and 




IPsec is a set of protocols to support a secure 
exchange of packets at the IP layer. It uses two protocols 
to provide traffic security services, Authentication Header 
(AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). 
The IP Authentication Header (AH) offers integrity and 
date origin authentication, with optional anti-replay 
features. 
The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol 
offers the same set of services, and also offers 
confidentiality (provide authentication and encryption only 
for the headers following the ESP header). 
Currently only the ESP IPsec protocol is supported in 
MIPL.  
IPsec supports two tunnel modes: Transport and Tunnel. 
Transport mode encrypts only the transport (layer 4) and 
data portion (application payload) of each packet, but 
leaves the original IP header in the clear. The more secure 
Tunnel mode encrypts both the original IP header and the 
upper layers. On the receiving side, an IPSec-compliant 
device decrypts each packet. 
The protection offered by IPsec is based on 
requirements defined by a Security Policy Database (SPD) 
which is established and maintained by user or system 
administrator, or by an application operating within 
constraints established by either of the above. 
In our case, it is the MIPL which establishes the SPD 
between HA and MN. An SPD cannot be dictated because the 
CoA of MN is not known in advance in the foreign network. 
Only the MIPL can manage the binding between CoA and HoA. 
65 
The Security Association Database (SAD) contains 
parameters that are associated with each established 
Security Association (SA). A SA is a simplex "connection" 
that provides security services to the traffic carried by 
it. 
In order to enable IPsec in the test bed the following 
changes have to be made: 
• IPsec should be enabled in mip6d.conf files of 
both the HA and MN (UseMnHaIPsec enabled;) and a 
set of IPsec policy should be added (see 
Appendices A and B for more details in files 
mip6d.conf) 
• SAs should be set manually. The configuration 
file (sa.conf), must be the same on the MN and HA 
(see Appendices A and B for more details in files 
sa.conf (they must be the same)) 
One interesting observation is that, when the sa.conf 
files were implemented, the des-cbc “secret” should have 
exactly eight characters while the hmac-sha1 “secret” 
should have exactly 20 characters. 
The set of commands that were used was the following: 
Load the implemented configuration: 
# setkey -f /etc/sa.conf 
Verify the SAD: 
# setkey –D 
Flush the SPD: 
# setkey –FP 
Flush the SAD: 
# setkey –F 
Initially, when the MN is at Home Network, the SPD can 
be seen, executing the command: 
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# setkey -D 
and the output of the command is: 
MN2:/etc # setkey -D 
2003::2 2003::1 
        esp mode=tunnel spi=2005(0x000007d5) reqid=0(0x00000000) 
        E: des-cbc  6d795f6b 65795f31 
        A: hmac-sha1  74686973 20697320 74686520 74657374 206b6579 
        seq=0x00000000 replay=0 flags=0x00000000 state=mature 
        created: Feb 16 10:29:32 2007   current: Feb 17 21:31:50 2007 
        diff: 126138(s) hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        last:                           hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        current: 0(bytes)       hard: 0(bytes)  soft: 0(bytes) 
        allocated: 0    hard: 0 soft: 0 
        sadb_seq=5 pid=20007 refcnt=0 
2003::2 2003::1 
        esp mode=transport spi=2003(0x000007d3) reqid=3(0x00000003) 
        E: des-cbc  6d795f6b 65795f31 
        A: hmac-sha1  74686973 20697320 74686520 74657374 206b6579 
        seq=0x00000000 replay=0 flags=0x00000000 state=mature 
        created: Feb 16 10:29:32 2007   current: Feb 17 21:31:50 2007 
        diff: 126138(s) hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        last:                           hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        current: 0(bytes)       hard: 0(bytes)  soft: 0(bytes) 
        allocated: 0    hard: 0 soft: 0 
        sadb_seq=4 pid=20007 refcnt=0 
2003::2 2003::1 
        esp mode=transport spi=2001(0x000007d1) reqid=2(0x00000002) 
        E: des-cbc  6d795f6b 65795f31 
        A: hmac-sha1  74686973 20697320 74686520 74657374 206b6579 
        seq=0x00000000 replay=0 flags=0x00000000 state=mature 
        created: Feb 16 10:29:32 2007   current: Feb 17 21:31:50 2007 
        diff: 126138(s) hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        last:                           hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        current: 0(bytes)       hard: 0(bytes)  soft: 0(bytes) 
        allocated: 0    hard: 0 soft: 0 
        sadb_seq=3 pid=20007 refcnt=0 
2003::1 2003::2 
        esp mode=tunnel spi=2004(0x000007d4) reqid=0(0x00000000) 
        E: des-cbc  6d795f6b 65795f31 
        A: hmac-sha1  74686973 20697320 74686520 74657374 206b6579 
        seq=0x00000000 replay=0 flags=0x00000000 state=mature 
        created: Feb 16 10:29:32 2007   current: Feb 17 21:31:50 2007 
        diff: 126138(s) hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        last:                           hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        current: 0(bytes)       hard: 0(bytes)  soft: 0(bytes) 
        allocated: 0    hard: 0 soft: 0 
        sadb_seq=2 pid=20007 refcnt=0 
2003::1 2003::2 
        esp mode=transport spi=2002(0x000007d2) reqid=3(0x00000003) 
        E: des-cbc  6d795f6b 65795f31 
        A: hmac-sha1  74686973 20697320 74686520 74657374 206b6579 
        seq=0x00000000 replay=0 flags=0x00000000 state=mature 
        created: Feb 16 10:29:32 2007   current: Feb 17 21:31:50 2007 
        diff: 126138(s) hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
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        last:                           hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        current: 0(bytes)       hard: 0(bytes)  soft: 0(bytes) 
        allocated: 0    hard: 0 soft: 0 
        sadb_seq=1 pid=20007 refcnt=0 
2003::1 2003::2 
        esp mode=transport spi=2000(0x000007d0) reqid=1(0x00000001) 
        E: des-cbc  6d795f6b 65795f31 
        A: hmac-sha1  74686973 20697320 74686520 74657374 206b6579 
        seq=0x00000000 replay=0 flags=0x00000000 state=mature 
        created: Feb 16 10:29:32 2007   current: Feb 17 21:31:50 2007 
        diff: 126138(s) hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        last: Feb 16 15:26:37 2007      hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        current: 26352(bytes)   hard: 0(bytes)  soft: 0(bytes) 
        allocated: 244  hard: 0 soft: 0 
        sadb_seq=0 pid=20007 refcnt=0 
 
Figure 21.   MN SPD Output before MN Moves to the Foreign 
Network 
 
When the MN moves to the foreign network, the SPD is 




MN2:/etc # setkey -D 
2003::2 2003::1 
        esp mode=transport spi=2003(0x000007d3) reqid=3(0x00000003) 
        E: des-cbc  6d795f6b 65795f31 
        A: hmac-sha1  74686973 20697320 74686520 74657374 206b6579 
        seq=0x00000000 replay=0 flags=0x00000000 state=mature 
        created: Feb 16 10:29:32 2007   current: Feb 22 16:26:47 2007 
        diff: 539835(s) hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        last: Feb 22 16:26:00 2007      hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        current: 520(bytes)     hard: 0(bytes)  soft: 0(bytes) 
        allocated: 13   hard: 0 soft: 0 
        sadb_seq=5 pid=5823 refcnt=0 
2003::2 2003::1 
        esp mode=transport spi=2001(0x000007d1) reqid=2(0x00000002) 
        E: des-cbc  6d795f6b 65795f31 
        A: hmac-sha1  74686973 20697320 74686520 74657374 206b6579 
        seq=0x00000000 replay=0 flags=0x00000000 state=mature 
        created: Feb 16 10:29:32 2007   current: Feb 22 16:26:47 2007 
        diff: 539835(s) hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        last: Feb 22 16:25:58 2007      hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        current: 368(bytes)     hard: 0(bytes)  soft: 0(bytes) 
        allocated: 23   hard: 0 soft: 0 
        sadb_seq=4 pid=5823 refcnt=0 
2005::212:3fff:feae:205b 2003::2 
        esp mode=tunnel spi=2004(0x000007d4) reqid=0(0x00000000) 
        E: des-cbc  6d795f6b 65795f31 
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        A: hmac-sha1  74686973 20697320 74686520 74657374 206b6579 
        seq=0x00000000 replay=0 flags=0x00000000 state=mature 
        created: Feb 16 10:29:32 2007   current: Feb 22 16:26:47 2007 
        diff: 539835(s) hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        last: Feb 22 16:25:58 2007      hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        current: 132(bytes)     hard: 0(bytes)  soft: 0(bytes) 
        allocated: 1    hard: 0 soft: 0 
        sadb_seq=3 pid=5823 refcnt=0 
2003::1 2003::2 
        esp mode=transport spi=2002(0x000007d2) reqid=3(0x00000003) 
        E: des-cbc  6d795f6b 65795f31 
        A: hmac-sha1  74686973 20697320 74686520 74657374 206b6579 
        seq=0x00000000 replay=0 flags=0x00000000 state=mature 
        created: Feb 16 10:29:32 2007   current: Feb 22 16:26:47 2007 
        diff: 539835(s) hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        last: Feb 22 16:26:00 2007      hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        current: 1092(bytes)    hard: 0(bytes)  soft: 0(bytes) 
        allocated: 13   hard: 0 soft: 0 
        sadb_seq=2 pid=5823 refcnt=0 
2003::1 2003::2 
        esp mode=transport spi=2000(0x000007d0) reqid=1(0x00000001) 
        E: des-cbc  6d795f6b 65795f31 
        A: hmac-sha1  74686973 20697320 74686520 74657374 206b6579 
        seq=0x00000000 replay=0 flags=0x00000000 state=mature 
        created: Feb 16 10:29:32 2007   current: Feb 22 16:26:47 2007 
        diff: 539835(s) hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        last: Feb 22 16:25:57 2007      hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        current: 42984(bytes)   hard: 0(bytes)  soft: 0(bytes) 
        allocated: 398  hard: 0 soft: 0 
        sadb_seq=1 pid=5823 refcnt=0 
 
2003::2 2005::212:3fff:feae:205b 
        esp mode=tunnel spi=2005(0x000007d5) reqid=0(0x00000000) 
        E: des-cbc  6d795f6b 65795f31 
        A: hmac-sha1  74686973 20697320 74686520 74657374 206b6579 
        seq=0x00000000 replay=0 flags=0x00000000 state=mature 
        created: Feb 16 10:29:32 2007   current: Feb 22 16:26:47 2007 
        diff: 539835(s) hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        last: Feb 22 16:25:58 2007      hard: 0(s)      soft: 0(s) 
        current: 64(bytes)      hard: 0(bytes)  soft: 0(bytes) 
        allocated: 1    hard: 0 soft: 0 
        sadb_seq=0 pid=5823 refcnt=0 
 
Figure 22.   MN SPD Output after MN Moves to the Foreign 
Network 
 
Figure 23 illustrates the whole RR procedure, 




Figure 23.   Ethereal Screen Capture of RR Procedure 
 
Packet #19 is sent from the CoA of the MN to the HA 
and it is protected by ESP. This packet is the BU of MN for 
its new CoA. 
In packet #23, the HA acknowledges the BU (BA). 
Packet #26 is sent from the CoA of the MN to the HA 
and it is also protected by ESP. Almost at the same time, 
sends a COTI message (packet#27) to the CN. It can be 
safely assumed that packet #26 is the protected by ESP HOTI 
message. 
Packet#28 is the protected by ESP, HOT message. 
Packet#29 is the COT message. 
Packet#30 is a binding update (BU) from the CoA of the 
MN to the CN. 
Packet#30 is the Binding Acknowledge from the CN to 
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IV. SECURITY ISSUES OF MOBILE IPV6  
This chapter presents possible threats against the 
Return Routability protocol and discusses the effectiveness 
of the security mechanisms provided by the protocol against 
these attacks. Alternative proposals for better securing 
the protocol are also described. 
A. IDENTIFIED SECURITY THREATS AND MIPV6 PROTOCOL DEFENCE 
The following table summarizes the possible attacks 
against the MIPv6 protocol and how the protocol mitigates 
these attacks as described in [Aura06]: 




neither on the 
CN-HoA route 
nor within the 
local network 
of CN) 
Signaling messages between the MN and its HA 
are encrypted via IPsec and authenticated  
Connection 
Hijack Attack 
Session protected by the mobility header 
used for the BU message , that includes the 
BU, a nonce indices option and a binding 
authorization option. 
 
Bombing Attack Case 1: Target of the attack is an existent 
IP address 
     The IP layer at target during the 
process of the decapsulation of the routing 
header encounters the “unknown” address of 
the attacker and drop the packets without 
passing it to the transport layer. 
Case 2: Target of the attack is a non-
existent IP address 
     The router of the subnet of the non-
existent IP address should send an ICMP 
Destination Unreachable message to the 




Threat Solution provided by RR procedure [Aura06] 
Replay Attack The Sequence Number of the ESP header 
provides anti-replay protection for the 
packet. The sequence number is 32-bit long 
starting from 1) which provides an unique id 
for each packet sent over the quick mode 
security association for the communication. 
The sequence number cannot repeat for the 
life of the quick mode security association. 
The receiver checks this field to verify 
that a packet for a security association 
with this number has not already been 
received. If one has been received, the 
packet is rejected.  
[http://technet2.microsoft.com/WindowsServer
/en/library/c3a956bf-704b-4980-9655-
762985e380f61033.mspx?mfr=true Last visited 
on March 15, 2007] 
CPU Exhaustion RR protocol uses relatively inexpensive 
encryption and one-way hash functions and 




The CN does not store a separate key for 
each MN. Instead it stores a single 
periodically-changing randomly generated 
master secret (Kcn) and computes the two 
keygen tokens with a one-way function from 
the master secret and from HoA and CoA 
Home keygen token = First (64, 
HMAC_SHA1(Kcn, home address|nonce|0)) 
 and  
Care-of keygen token = First(64, MAC (Kcn, 





the CN to 
respond with a 




that of the 
query.) 
The CN waits to receive both HOTI and COTI 
messages from the MN. Then, it replies to MN 
with only two messages, HOT and COT, sending 
only as many messages as it receives, thus 
eliminating the amplification problem. 
 
Reflection The CN responds always to the same address 
from which it receives a message. 
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Threat Solution provided by RR procedure [Aura06] 
HOT, COT and 
BA spoofing  
Usage of nonces (home init cookie-Care-of 
init cookie) in the HOTI and COTI messages, 
which the CN copies to the HOT and COT 
messages, respectively. 
Insider attack 
from CN local 
network 
Can be mitigated if the CN is also a MN of a 
HA. In that way all keygen tokens are 
protected by IPsec(ESP). 
Table 4.   Possible Threats and Defense Mechanisms 
provided by the RR Protocol 
 
B. TEST BED SECURITY OBSERVATIONS 
1. It is clearly stated in [Aura06] that the RR 
protocol does not defend against an attacker who 
can monitor the CN-HA data path. This threat can 
be mitigated if the CN is a MN itself. 
2. A HA router can be easily identified, since it 
transmits on the clear (inside the router 
advertisements) its identity of being a HA. 
3. The files that determine the security 
associations are stored in both the routers and 
the MN’s file system. Routers are generally well 
protected, but the file security at MN depends on 
the user behavior. In cases where an attacker has 
broken into the MN’s file system, the attacker 
can acquire the security association 
configuration file, which contains the security 
credentials and all the necessary information to 
implement any kind of attack against the MN. 
4. The last 64 bits of the MN’s IP CoA are 
predictable, since the CoA is configured 
according to the attached router advertisements 
due to Stateless DHCP (not a major concern since 
can be mandated to use statefull DHCP). 
C. ATTACK TRAFFIC GENERATION WITH SCAPY6 
Scapy [http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy/ Last 
visited on March 8, 2007] is a powerful interactive packet 
manipulation program. Scapy6 was the IPv6 version of Scapy, 
which is now named mip6 (executable file mip6.py). It is 
written in Python and runs natively on Linux, and on most 
Unix systems with libpcap, libdnet and their respective 
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python wrapper. The scapy6.py and mip6.py files that can be 
used to construct mobile ipv6 packets can be found at 
[http://namabiiru.hongo.wide.ad.jp/scapy6/ Last visited on 
March 12, 2007]. Detailed examples of MIPv6 packet 
construction can be found in: 
[http://namabiiru.hongo.wide.ad.jp/scapy6/uts/mip6-test-
report.html Last visited on March 12, 2007]. 
For this thesis, Scapy was used for the construction 
of one “bogus” BU message. Our goal was to inject a storm 
of fake BU to the CN from a machine that impersonates the 
MN during a MIPv6 MN-CN session. 
Specifically, the attack machine was first attached to 
the 2000::/64 interface of the CNrouter, having in mind 
that the attack should be implemented from outside the MN-
CN path. It then flooded the CN with 4000 fake BU’s, during 
a Mobile IPv6 session between the MN and the CN. The flood 
attack was unsuccessful, as it was expected. The 
performance of the ongoing session between the MN and the 
CN was not affected at all during the attack, demonstrating 
the MIPv6 protocol’s effectiveness against false BUs. 
Details of how the fake BU was built using Scapy6 are 
given in Appendix F. 
D. WORK IN PROGRESS FOR SECURING THE ROUTE OPTIMIZATION 
PROCEDURE FOR MOBILE IPV6 
There is a lot of work in progress for enhancing the 
Mobile IPv6 Route Optimization procedure. 
Vogt and Arkko in [Vogt07] describe and evaluate 
strategies to enhance Mobile IPv6 Route Optimization, on 
the basis of existing proposals, in order to motivate and 
guide further research in this context. 
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Dupont in [Depont 07] analyses some new kinds of 
reflection attacks, as known as 3rd party bombing 
introduced by Mobile IPv6 and makes some recommendations in 
order to protect the MIPv6 protocol. 
Li, et al., in [Li07] puts forward a mechanism called 
ECC RRP, which enhances the key management for the Return 
Routability Procedure with anonymous Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) Key Agreement Protocol. The proposed 
solution is not prone to attacks by nodes on the route from 
CN to HA in way that the RR process described in [RFC 3775] 
and reduces the latency related to handovers that require 
new binding updates. 
Mun, et al., in [Mun06] propose an optimized scheme 
which performs Routing Optimization using the AAA 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK  
The main objective of this research effort was to 
build a test bed for investigating the vulnerabilities of 
the Mobile IPv6 RR procedure. The test bed should 
facilitate the enactment and analysis of the effects of 
specific threats on the Mobile IPv6 hosts and the network. 
While this thesis is not about discovering new 
vulnerabilities or evaluating countermeasures, the 
resulting test bed and software has laid the necessary 
groundwork for future research in those directions. 
It must be mentioned that RR is not the only way to 
secure MIPv6 messages. Alternatively, MIPv6 can be secured 
using public keys and certificates or Cryptographic 
Generated Addresses (CGAs), having always in mind that 
there is always a trade-off between convenience and 
security. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The major findings from this thesis research are: 
• When stateless DHCP is used, the last 64 bits of 
the MN’s IP CoA is predictable (EUI64), since the 
CoA is configured according to the attached 
router advertisements. If an Attacker knows a 
node’s MAC address, he can violate its location 
privacy (the prefix would give out its location 
in the Internet). Stateful DHCP is mandated for 
location privacy. Stateless DHCP is more 
convenient for private or campus networks that 
are protected by firewalls, covering the issue of 
location privacy. 
• The RR procedure uses IPsec for authentication, 
with relatively inexpensive encryption and one-
way hash functions. The consumption of CPU power 
is not a major concern (which is extremely 
important for mobile devices). There is always 
the solution of using PKI, but the processing 
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overhead of existing PKI solutions is 
particularly noticeable within the context of 
mobile handheld devices, such as PDAs (Personal 
Digital Assistants) or mobile/smart phones, which 
have certain limitations regarding storage and 
computational capacity because of their small 
size. 
• The security of the MIPv6 protocol is yet to be 
“battle-tested”. Most existing MIPv6 
implementations are still intended for research 
and development purposes. There are many 
different implementations, as indicated in 
Chapter 2, and the protocol itself is under 
continuous improvement and refinement. There is 
not yet any Microsoft OS implementation of MIPv6 
protocol.  
B. FUTURE WORK 
The main remaining vulnerability in the RR protocol is 
that an attacker, in the same local network as the 
correspondent node, may be able to intercept and spoof all 
of the BU protocol messages [Aura06]. The present test bed 
can be extended in such a way that both MN and CN be MNs 
belonging to their respective home agents. Theoretically, 
such a configuration would protect all RR messages with 
IPsec. It would be interesting to see how the protocol 
would react and defend itself in such an occasion against 
the possible attacks. That way, the two communicating 
mobile nodes can securely optimize the routing between 
their care-of addresses regardless of any potential 
attacker on the current access networks [Aura06]. 
Currently, Scapy6 does not support the construction of 
HOTI, COTI, HOT, and COT packets. An extension to Scapy6 to 
support all kinds of RR messages would give the opportunity 
to MIPv6 developers to evaluate the security threats of 
MIPv6 protocol under realistic simulation conditions. The 
implementation of all identified threats against the RR 
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procedure, using Scapy6 or other software, would help 
evaluate the effectivenss of the proposed solution of IPsec 
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APPENDIX A.  CONFIGURATION FILES OF HA 
The following table contains the configuration files 
of HA along with their locations. 
 
Configuration File Location Functionality 
radvd.conf /etc/ Advertise the 
prefixes of the 
Router’s interfaces 





zebra.conf /etc/quagga Along with ripngd 
daemon provides 
IPv6 routing for 
the test bed 
mip6d.conf /usr/local/sbin MIPv6 configuration 
file used by mip6d 
daemon 






#This is the radvd.conf file of the HA 
#Location: /etc/radvd.conf 
#This daemon advertises the prefixes of the interfaces of the HA 
router; 
#Note that only the interface 0 has the option AdvHomeAgentFlag on; 
 interface eth0 
     { 
        AdvSendAdvert on; 
        MaxRtrAdvInterval 3; 
        MinRtrAdvInterval 1; 
        AdvIntervalOpt on; 
        AdvHomeAgentFlag on; 
        HomeAgentLifetime 10000; 
        HomeAgentPreference 20; 
        AdvHomeAgentInfo on; 
        prefix 2003::2/64 
        { 
          AdvRouterAddr on; 
          AdvOnLink on; 
          AdvAutonomous on; 
          AdvPreferredLifetime 10000; 
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          AdvValidLifetime 12000; 
        }; 
      }; 
  interface eth1 
     { 
        AdvSendAdvert on; 
        MaxRtrAdvInterval 10; 
        MinRtrAdvInterval 3; 
        AdvIntervalOpt on; 
        prefix 2004::2/64 
        { 
          AdvRouterAddr on; 
          AdvOnLink on; 
          AdvAutonomous on; 
        }; 
      }; 
interface eth2 
     { 
        AdvSendAdvert on; 
        MaxRtrAdvInterval 10; 
        MinRtrAdvInterval 3; 
        AdvIntervalOpt on; 
        prefix 2002::2/64 
        { 
          AdvRouterAddr on; 
          AdvOnLink on; 
          AdvAutonomous on; 
        }; 




!This is the ripngd.conf file of the HA 
!Location:/etc/quagga/ripngd.conf 
!This daemon implements the standard Routing Information 





  network eth0 
  network eth1 
  network eth2 
  redistribute connected 
  redistribute static 




!This is the zebra.conf file of the HA 
!Location:/etc/quagga/zebra.conf 
!This daemon along with ripngd provide the 
!tesbed with IPv6 routing 
hostname quagga 
password quagga 
enable password quagga 
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log file /var/log/quagga/quagga.log 
! 
interface eth0 
 ipv6 address 2003::2/64 
 ipv6 nd prefix 2003::/64 
 no ipv6 nd suppress-ra 
 ipv6 nd ra-interval 10 
! 
interface eth1 
 ipv6 address 2004::2/64 
 ipv6 nd prefix 2004::/64 
 ipv6 nd suppress-ra 
 ipv6 nd ra-interval 10 
! 
interface eth2 
 ipv6 address 2002::2/64 
 ipv6 nd suppress-ra 









ipv6 route 2001::/64  2002::1 






# This is the mip6d.conf file of the HA 
# Location: /etc/mip6d.conf 
# Mobile IPv6 configuration file: Home Agent 
# This file provides MIPv6 functionality to the HA 
# via daemon mip6d  
 
         # filename: /etc/mip6d.conf          
         NodeConfig HA; 
         ## If set to > 0, will not detach from tty 
         DebugLevel 10; 
          
         ## List of interfaces where we serve as Home Agent 
         Interface "eth0"; 
         ## 
         ## IPsec configuration 
         ## Use when IPsec is not enabled 
   ## UseMnHaIPsec disabled; 
         ## Use when IPsec is enabled 
    UseMnHaIPsec enabled; 
         ## Define the set of IPsec Policy 
          IPsecPolicySet { 
                HomeAgentAddress 2003::2; 
                HomeAddress 2003::1/64; 
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                IPsecPolicy HomeRegBinding UseESP 1 2; 
                IPsecPolicy MobPfxDisc UseESP 3; 
                IPsecPolicy TunnelMh UseESP; 




# This is the Security Association configuration  file of HA 
# Note that an exact copy of this file resides also at MN 
# To activate run: #setkey –f /etc/sa.conf 
# Location:/etc/sa.conf  
#------------------------------- 
# 2003::1 is home address of MN 
# 2003::2 is address of HA 
#des-cbc key should be 8 characters long 




# MN -> HA transport SA for BU 
 add 2003:0:0:0::1 2003:0:0:0::2 esp 2000 
       -u 1 
       -m transport 
       -E des-cbc "my_key_1" 
       -A hmac-sha1 "this is the test key" ; 
 
# HA -> MN transport SA for BA 
 add 2003:0:0:0::2 2003:0:0:0::1 esp 2001 
 -u 2 
        -m transport 
        -E des-cbc "my_key_1" 
        -A hmac-sha1 "this is the test key" ; 
 
# MN -> HA transport SA for MPS 
 add 2003:0:0:0::1 2003:0:0:0::2 esp 2002 
 -u 3 
        -m transport 
        -E des-cbc "my_key_1" 
        -A hmac-sha1 "this is the test key" ; 
 
# HA -> MN transport SA for MPA 
 add 2003:0:0:0::2 2003:0:0:0::1 esp 2003 
 -u 3 
        -m transport 
        -E des-cbc "my_key_1" 
        -A hmac-sha1 "this is the test key" ; 
 
# MN -> HA tunnel SA for HoTI 
 add 2003:0:0:0::1 2003:0:0:0::2 esp 2004 
        -m tunnel 
        -E des-cbc "my_key_1" 






# HA -> MN tunnel SA for HoT 
 add 2003:0:0:0::2 2003:0:0:0::1 esp 2005 
        -m tunnel 
        -E des-cbc "my_key_1" 
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APPENDIX B.  CONFIGURATION FILES OF MN 
The following table contains the configuration files 
of MN along with their locations. 
 
Configuration File Location Functionality 
mip6d.conf /usr/local/sbin MIPv6 configuration 
file used by mip6d 
daemon 






# This is the mip6d.conf file of the MN 
# Location: /etc/mip6d.conf 
# Mobile IPv6 configuration file: Mobile Node 
# This file provides MIPv6 functionality to the MN 
# via daemon mip6d  
         # 
         # filename: /etc/mip6d.conf          
 
         NodeConfig MN; 
 
         ## If set to > 0, will not detach from tty 
         DebugLevel 10; 
         ## Enable RO 
         DoRouteOptimizationMN enabled; 
         DoRouteOptimizationCN enabled; 
          
         MnDiscardHaParamProb enabled; 
         Interface "eth0"; 
         MnHomeLink "eth0" { 
                 HomeAgentAddress 2003::2; 
                 HomeAddress 2003::1/64; 
         } 
         ## IPsec configuration 
         ##  
         UseMnHaIPsec enabled; 
         IPsecPolicySet { 
                 HomeAgentAddress 2003::2; 
                 HomeAddress 2003::1/64; 
                 IPsecPolicy HomeRegBinding UseESP1 2; 
                 IPsecPolicy MobPfxDisc UseESP 3; 
                 IPsecPolicy TunnelMh UseESP; 








# This is the Security Association configuration file of MN 
# Note that an exact copy of this file resides also at HA 
# To activate run: #setkey –f /etc/sa.conf 
# Location:/etc/sa.conf  
#------------------------------- 
# 2003::1 is home address of MN 
# 2003::2 is address of HA 
#des-cbc key should be 8 characters long 




# MN -> HA transport SA for BU 
 add 2003:0:0:0::1 2003:0:0:0::2 esp 2000 
       -u 1 
       -m transport 
       -E des-cbc "my_key_1" 
       -A hmac-sha1 "this is the test key" ; 
 
# HA -> MN transport SA for BA 
 add 2003:0:0:0::2 2003:0:0:0::1 esp 2001 
 -u 2 
        -m transport 
        -E des-cbc "my_key_1" 
        -A hmac-sha1 "this is the test key" ; 
 
# MN -> HA transport SA for MPS 
 add 2003:0:0:0::1 2003:0:0:0::2 esp 2002 
 -u 3 
        -m transport 
        -E des-cbc "my_key_1" 
        -A hmac-sha1 "this is the test key" ; 
 
# HA -> MN transport SA for MPA 
 add 2003:0:0:0::2 2003:0:0:0::1 esp 2003 
 -u 3 
        -m transport 
        -E des-cbc "my_key_1" 
        -A hmac-sha1 "this is the test key" ; 
 
# MN -> HA tunnel SA for HoTI 
 add 2003:0:0:0::1 2003:0:0:0::2 esp 2004 
        -m tunnel 
        -E des-cbc "my_key_1" 
        -A hmac-sha1 "this is the test key" ; 
 
# HA -> MN tunnel SA for HoT 
 add 2003:0:0:0::2 2003:0:0:0::1 esp 2005 
        -m tunnel 
        -E des-cbc "my_key_1" 
        -A hmac-sha1 "this is the test key" ; 
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APPENDIX C.  CONFIGURATION FILES OF CNROUTER 
The following table contains the configuration files 
of CN along with their locations. 
 
Configuration File Location Functionality 
mip6d.conf /usr/local/sbin MIPv6 configuration 





# This is the mip6d.conf file of the CN 
# Location: /etc/mip6d.conf 
# Mobile IPv6 configuration file: Correspondent Node  
# This file provides MIPv6 functionality to the CN 
# via daemon mip6d  
NodeConfig CN; 
## If set to > 0, will not detach from tty 
DebugLevel 10; 
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APPENDIX D.  CONFIGURATION FILES OF FROUTER 
The following table contains the configuration files 
of Frouter along with their locations. 
 
Configuration File Location Functionality 
radvd.conf /etc/ Advertise the 
prefixes of the 
Router’s interfaces 





zebra.conf /etc/quagga Along with ripngd 
daemon provides 
IPv6 routing for 




# This is the radvd.conf file of the Frouter 
# Location: /etc/radvd.conf 
# This daemon advertises the prefixes of the interfaces of the Frouter 
        interface eth0 
    { 
          AdvSendAdvert on; 
          AdvIntervalOpt on; 
          MinRtrAdvInterval 3; 
          MaxRtrAdvInterval 10; 
          AdvHomeAgentFlag off; 
          prefix 2004::/64 
          { 
              AdvOnLink on; 
              AdvAutonomous on; 
              AdvRouterAddr on; 
          }; 
    }; 
    interface eth1 
    { 
          AdvSendAdvert on; 
          AdvIntervalOpt on; 
          MinRtrAdvInterval 3; 
          MaxRtrAdvInterval 10; 
          AdvHomeAgentFlag off; 
          prefix 2005::/64 
          { 
              AdvOnLink on; 
              AdvAutonomous on; 
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              AdvRouterAddr on; 
          }; 
    }; 
ripngd.conf 
 
!This is the ripngd.conf file of the Frouter 
!Location:/etc/quagga/ripngd.conf 
!This daemon implements the standard Routing Information 





  network eth0 
  network eth1 
  redistribute connected 
  redistribute static 




!This is the zebra.conf file of the Frouter 
!Location:/etc/quagga/zebra.conf 
!This daemon along with ripngd provide the 
!tesbed with IPv6 routing 
hostname quagga 
password quagga 
enable password quagga 
log file /var/log/quagga/quagga.log 
! 
interface eth0 
 ipv6 address 2004::3/64 
 ipv6 nd prefix 2004::/64 
 ipv6 nd suppress-ra 
 ipv6 nd ra-interval 10 
! 
interface eth1 
 ipv6 address 2005::3/64 
ipv6 nd prefix 2005::/64  
no ipv6 nd suppress-ra 









ipv6 route 2001::/64 2004::2 
ipv6 route 2002::/64 2004::2 





APPENDIX E.  CONFIGURATION FILES OF CNROUTER 
The following table contains the configuration files 
of CNrouter along with their locations. 
 
Configuration File Location Functionality 
radvd.conf /etc/ Advertise the 
prefixes of the 
Router’s interfaces 





zebra.conf /etc/quagga Along with ripngd 
daemon provides 
IPv6 routing for 




#This is the radvd.conf file of the CNrouter 
#Location: /etc/radvd.conf 
#This daemon advertises the prefixes of the interfaces of the CNrouter 
interface eth0 
    { 
          AdvSendAdvert on; 
          AdvIntervalOpt on; 
 
          MinRtrAdvInterval 3; 
          MaxRtrAdvInterval 10; 
          AdvHomeAgentFlag off; 
 
          prefix 2002::1/64 
          { 
              AdvOnLink on; 
              AdvAutonomous on; 
              AdvRouterAddr on; 
          }; 
    }; 
 
interface eth1 
    { 
          AdvSendAdvert on; 
          AdvIntervalOpt on; 
 
          MinRtrAdvInterval 3; 
          MaxRtrAdvInterval 10; 
          AdvHomeAgentFlag off; 
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          prefix 2000::1/64 
          { 
              AdvOnLink on; 
              AdvAutonomous on; 
              AdvRouterAddr on; 
          }; 
    }; 
 
 interface eth2 
    { 
          AdvSendAdvert on; 
          AdvIntervalOpt on; 
 
          MinRtrAdvInterval 3; 
          MaxRtrAdvInterval 10; 
          AdvHomeAgentFlag off; 
 
          prefix 2001::1/64 
          { 
              AdvOnLink on; 
              AdvAutonomous on; 
              AdvRouterAddr on; 
          }; 




!This is the ripngd.conf file of the CNrouter 
!Location:/etc/quagga/ripngd.conf 
!This daemon implements the standard Routing Information 





 network eth0 
 network eth1  
 network eth2 
  redistribute connected 
  redistribute static 





!This is the zebra.conf file of the CNrouter 
!Location:/etc/quagga/zebra.conf 
!This daemon along with ripngd provide the 
!tesbed with IPv6 routing 
! 
! Zebra configuration saved from vty 





enable password quagga 
log file /var/log/quagga/quagga.log 
! 
interface eth0 
 ipv6 address 2002::1/64 
 ipv6 nd prefix 2002::/64 
 ipv6 nd suppress-ra 
 ipv6 nd ra-interval 10 
! 
interface eth1 
 ipv6 address 2000::1/64 
 ipv6 nd suppress-ra 
 ipv6 nd ra-interval 10 
! 
interface eth2 
 ipv6 address 2001::1/64 
 ipv6 nd prefix 2001::/64 
 no ipv6 nd suppress-ra 









ipv6 route 2003::/64 2002::2 
ipv6 route 2004::/64 2002::2 
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APPENDIX F.  USING SCAPY6 FOR CONSTRUCTING A BU 
MESSAGE 
This appendix describes the way that a BU message is 
constructed, using mip6.py (the IPv6 version of Scapy). It 
is impressing that a complicated message like a mobile IPv6 
BU constructed with a few commands (/*Comments*/). 
 













/*An IPv6 header has been constructed */ 
 
>>> b1.show() 
###[ IPv6 ]### 
  version= 6 
  tc= 0 
  fl= 0 
  plen= 0 
  nh= No Next Header 
  hlim= 64 
  src= 2000::212:3fff:fead:f081 
  dst= 2001::8 [Teredo srv: 0.0.0.0 cli: 255.255.255.247:65535] 
 
/*An Extension Header (Destination Options Header) with */ 








/*This is the result of the concatenation*/ 
 
>>> b3.show() 
###[ IPv6 ]### 
  version= 6 
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  tc= 0 
  fl= 0 
  plen= 0 
  nh= Destination Option Header 
  hlim= 64 
  src= 2000::212:3fff:fead:f081 
  dst= 2001::8 [Teredo srv: 0.0.0.0 cli: 255.255.255.247:65535] 
###[ IPv6 Extension Header - Destination Options Header ]### 
     nh= No Next Header 
     len= 0 
     autopad= On 
     \options\ 
      |###[ Home Address Option ]### 
      |  otype= Home Address Option [11: discard+ICMP not mcast, 0: 
Don't change en-route] 
      |  optlen= 16 
      |  hoa= 2003::1 
 
/*Nonce Indices Option is created*/ 
 
>>> b4=NonceIndices( olen=4,hni=4, coni=4) 
 
/*Binding Authorization Data is created*/ 
 
>>> b5=BindingAuthData( authenticator=2807) 
 
/*A Mobility Header of Binding Update is created with */ 
/*the options of Nonce Indices and Binding Authorization*/ 
/*Data */ 
 
>>> b6=IPv6MobHdrBU( options=[b4,b5]) 
 
/*The final message is the concatenation of b3 */ 




/*The final outcome of our MIPv6 BU construction*/ 
 
>>> b_final.show() 
###[ IPv6 ]### 
  version= 6 
  tc= 0 
  fl= 0 
  plen= 0 
  nh= Destination Option Header 
  hlim= 64 
  src= 2000::212:3fff:fead:f081 
  dst= 2001::8 [Teredo srv: 0.0.0.0 cli: 255.255.255.247:65535] 
###[ IPv6 Extension Header - Destination Options Header ]### 
     nh= Mobility Header 
     len= 0 
     autopad= On 
     \options\ 
      |###[ Home Address Option ]### 
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      |  otype= Home Address Option [11: discard+ICMP not mcast, 0: 
Don't change en-route] 
      |  optlen= 16 
      |  hoa= 2003::1 
###[ IPv6 Mobility Header - Binding Update ]### 
        nh= No Next Header 
        len= 0 
        mhtype= BU 
        reserved= 0 
        cksum= 0x0 
        seq= 0x4242 
        flags= AMR 
        reserved= 0x0 
        mhtime= 0x3 
        autopad= On 
        \options\ 
         |###[ Mobile IPv6 - Nonce Indices ]### 
         |  otype= 4 
         |  olen= 4 
         |  hni= 4 
         |  coni= 4 
         |###[ Mobile IPv6 - Binding Authorization Data ]### 
         |  otype= 5 
         |  olen= 16 
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